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DISSONANT HARMONIZATION: LIMITATIONS ON "CASH N'
CARRY' CREATIVITY
Doris Estelle Lcng*
"Who is that?"
"Nobody. The author."1
ABSTRACT

Even though creativity lies at the heart of present copyright laws,
the impulse to create-or more precisely what triggers such
creativity-remains largely unexamined. 2 Coinciding with the
* Professor of Law and Chair, Intellectual Property, Information Technology and Privacy
Group, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois. I would like to express my
appreciation for the invaluable research assistance provided by Tamara Schiller and Wylie
Mok in connection with this article. I would also like to thank the students in my IP Digital
Classes through the years whose passionate debates over the scope of authorial rights have
helped to shape my views, although probably not in the direction many of them had hoped. I
would also like to thank Sheldon Halpern, Peter Halewood, Alice Hammerli, Silke Von
Lewinski, Miriam Nisbet and Ruth Okediji for their comments on an earlier draft; as well as
the participants of the Interdisciplinary Conference on the Impact of Technological Change on
the Creation and Dissemination and Protection of Intellectual Property, sponsored by the
Albany Law School, and the participants of the Michigan State University, College of Law,
Fourth Annual Scholars Conference in Intellectual Property for their helpful comments and
insight. Finally, I would like to thank Vera Lynn Long who taught me first hand how
precious the gift of creativity is.
I MARc NORMAN & TOM STOPPARD, SHAKESPEARE IN LOVE 49-50 (1998).
2 That does not mean that creativity itself has not been examined as part of the debate
over cultural appropriation and the public domain. To the contrary, most of the works cited
in this article deal with the issue of authorship-and by natural extension creativity-within
the confines of this ongoing debate. As Professor Julie Cohen recognizes in her recent article,
social sciences may provide useful analyses for reconfiguring the method of protection for socalled creative works. Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1151, 1190-92 (2007). Professor Cohen's approach, like many other articles
cited herein, places authorship and creativity within a broader view that owes much to the
postmodernist, post-structuralist rejection of the centrality of authorship. Id. at 1164; see
infra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. What I propose to do is reposition the question of
protectable creativity-and its correlative authorship-away from the intertextuality of poststructuralism and back to the issue of the processes by which individuals create new works.
Once we understand what causes authors, artists, and others to engage in acts of aesthetic
creativity, we will be better able to create domestic and international copyright standards
that encourage these processes and, consequently, encourage the creation of new aesthetic
works. Such an analysis requires an examination of the psychological, sociological, and
scientific explanations for creative processes. Understanding these processes should enable
us to craft narrowly tailored authorial rights that encourage creativity, while reducing undue
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digital demand for access to information, new standards for "cash 'n'
carry" creativity are being urged with little regard to what level of
authorial 3 control may be required to ensure continued enrichment
of the public domain through the creation of vibrant new works.
Scientific, psychological, and sociological studies indicate that "cash
'n' carry" creativity fails to implement the critical triggering
mechanisms for the creative impulse. Moreover, such "cash 'n'
carry" attitudes toward authors' rights threaten to establish new
international harmonization standards that continue the inequality
of earlier protection regimes. Instead of freeing works for the public
domain, current movements such as "access to knowledge," if not
carefully circumscribed in the copyright area, may adversely impact
efforts by developing nations and previously excluded voices to
protect local creative industries. Dissonances between the roles of
culture industries in economic development, and perceived
boundaries of the public domain, must be respected. In fact, new
international standards for the protection of "authors' rights" should
actually be broadened in certain instances to allow protection for
those voices whose creative works have been excluded or ignored in
previous regimes, including protection for indigenous works of
folklore and other traditional cultural expressions, and for works
whose intellectual creativity has been previously under appreciated,
including traditional "women's arts." Ultimately "cash 'n' carry"
creativity as an international standard, without sufficient
calibration for cultural and other dissonances, will only continue to
marginalize the already-excluded. Effective harmonization requires
more.
INTRODUCTION

There is no question that the latter decades of the twentieth
intrusions into the public domain. While all creators may not be motivated by the same
incentives, such individualized motivation should not prevent the adoption of a system which
affords a general benefit to motivated authors. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Personality
Interest ofArtists and Inventors in Intellectual Property, 16 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 8285 (1998) (noting that authors may be motivated by their identification with the products of
their work, such as through concepts of creativity, intentionality, and identification with the
res, all of which should be afforded protection in the intellectual property scheme).
3 For purposes of this Article, unless directly specified to the contrary, I use the terms
"author" and "artist" interchangeably. Thus, although I speak of "authorial control," I include
within this term the control of all creators of aesthetic works. Unless scientific, sociological,
or other evidence demonstrates that the impulses toward aesthetic creativity differ for
authors as opposed to artists or composers, there seems little reason to apply different
standards of authorial control.
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century saw a purported increase in the amount of harmonization
activities geared toward the general arena of copyright and its
companion neighboring rights. Since the 1990s, we have seen a
plethora of harmonization attempts: from the international
codification of "Berne plus" standards in the Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs),4 to the
"Internet" treaties-the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) Copyright Treaty 5 and the WIPO Performances and
Phonograms Treaty; 6 from the TRIPs Agreement and language of
various free trade agreements regarding the role of copyright
protection in the digital arena, 7 to the European Union directives
regarding Copyright in the Information Society.8
Although
international and regional attempts at harmonization have
occasionally stumbled-consider the aborted attempts to establish
an audiovisual performances treaty9 or a broadcast treaty' 0 in the
past decade-there is little reason to believe that harmonization
efforts will not continue apace, at least at the regional level, in the
4 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 9-14, Apr. 15,
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPs. I refer to these as "Berne plus"
simply because TRIPs added some critical new harmonization concepts regarding the lack of
protection for ideas and other non-expressive elements and the extension of protection to
computer programs and selected databases as literary works under Berne. Id. arts. 9-10;
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 1161
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention].
5 World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S.
152, 36 I.L.M. 65 [hereinafter WCT].
6 World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20,
1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
7 TRIPs, supra note 4, arts. 9-14. All of the Free Trade Agreements negotiated between
the United States and diverse countries since 2000 have included numerous provisions
regarding the protection of intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement,
U.S.-Bahr., Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, 42
I.L.M. 1026. Since the free trade agreement with Singapore, the agreements have also
included language that appears to strongly resemble the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of
the United States, particularly in connection with the copyright enforcement mechanisms on
the internet. See Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., arts. 16.1-10, May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
1026; see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201-1205 (2000). Although common usage continues to use
initial capitals to describe "the Internet," such usage is no longer seems appropriate given the
internet's wide spread and long standing use. Capital letters subconsciously tell us all that
the "Internet" is something so new that we cannot yet be expected to deal with the problems it
poses. The time for such complacency, along with the initial capital letters, is long past.
8 Council Directive 2001/29, On the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and
Related Rights in the Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 (EC).
9 Diplomatic Conference on the Protection of Audiovisual Performances, Dec. 7-20, 2000,
Basic Proposalfor Administrative and Final Provisionsof the InternationalInstrument on the
Protection of Audiovisual Performances to be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, U.N.
Doc. IAVP/DC/4 (Sept. 22, 2000).
10 World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Standing Comm. on Copyright & Related Rights,
Draft Basic Proposal for the WIPO Treaty on the Protection of Broadcasting Organizations,
U.N. Doc. SCCRI14/2 (Feb. 8, 2006).
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near future.II
There may be no more significant issue than the present and
future debates over the scope of rights to be granted authors for
Regardless of the philosophical basis on which
their works.
copyright protection is granted, 12 the heart of the issue remains the
extent to which authors (and other creators) should have the right
to control the use of their works by third parties. 13 A significant,
and I believe included, corollary to this control right, is the question
as to what the scope of any such control should be-is it exclusive?
Under what circumstances, if any, does it give way to other
interests? What is the value of such control? Compensatory?
11The success of harmonization efforts, given the growing philosophical divide between socalled "North" countries, including most notably the United States and members of the
European Union, and "South" countries, and the multiplicity of fora which are now
addressing aspects of intellectual property protection, including the "regime change" (as
described by Laurence Helfer in his seminal article), are topics that are beyond the scope of
this Article. E.g., Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New
Dynamics of InternationalIntellectual PropertyLawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 7-9 (2004).
So too is the equally intriguing question of whether any of these purported harmonization
attempts actually promote predictable "harmonized" protection of intellectual property rights.
I have elsewhere expressed my skepticism of the end results of such processes and the need
for better procedures to assure greater clarification of what "harmonization" we have actually
achieved. Doris Estelle Long, "Democratizing" Globalization: Practicing the Policies of
Cultural Inclusion, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L 217, 224-27 (2002) [hereinafter Long,
"Democratizing" Globalization]; Doris Estelle Long, "Globalization": A Future Trend or a
Satisfying Mirage?, 49 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y U.S.A. 313, 348-56 (2001) [hereinafter Long, A
Future Trend]. I do not intend to repeat those concerns here, but merely wish to state that
my general skepticism about the end result of such efforts remains unchanged absent
procedural reform. Such skepticism about the practical effects of "harmonization" does not
mean that the process of attempting to achieve harmonization is not a valuable one in and of
itself. To the contrary, even aborted efforts to achieve harmonization serve the valuable
informational purpose of allowing all parties to recognize areas of dissonance. Even if such
dissonance is not overcome, at least the clear articulation of the dissonance serves a valuable
predictive role insofar as international standards are concerned, and allows publishers,
distributors, and other public disseminators of copyrighted works to conform their behaviors
to predictable norms. Long, "Democratizing"Globalization, supra, at 246-47; Long, A Future
Trend, supra, at 355-56.
12 For a brief discussion of the various bases for supporting copyright protection, see infra
Part I.
13 I employ the term "use" not to suggest that copyright necessarily includes the right to
control the "use" of the work, such as the right to read the work, but simply in order to
suggest that "control" includes all aspects of any third party use of a work, including the uses
of publication, distribution, performance, display, and derivation, regardless of the
communication media involved. Such "control" also necessarily includes consideration of
what qualifies as "fair" and "compulsory" uses, as those terms are generally defined under
current national and international regimes. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 106-107, 118 (2000)
(defining authors' rights under U.S. copyright, fair use, and certain compulsory licenses,
respectively); TRIPs, supra note 4, art. 13 (defining fair use by allowing limited exceptions to
use prohibitions); cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483, 502-04 (2001) (recognizing that
digital media may implicate rights different from those granted for print and holding that
newspaper articles searchable in an online database are different from those found on
microfilm because of enhanced accessibility of online articles).
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Hortatory? Prohibitive?
Authorship 14 has been at the heart of copyright protection since at
least 1710 when the Statute of Anne recognized an exclusive right of
15
authors to control the publication of a limited category of works.
While there is a strong historical reason to believe that such
authorial control may have initially been the result of a
miscalculation by the publishing industry in attempting to reassert
their original printer's monopoly over protected works (at least in
part), 16 over time the role of the author as the center of rights in his
or her work has achieved both domestic and international
acceptance.1 7 Yet, in the latter decades of the twentieth century and
first decade of the twenty-first century, authorship and its
correlative creativity have "taken it on the chin," so to speak. The
importance of authorship has been questioned; creativity has been
largely disconnected from it, and any authorial control under
copyright is rapidly devolving into a "cash 'n' carry" compensatory
right,' 8 reducing the relationship between authorship, copyright,
and control to little more than an economic right of compensation.1 9
14 An examination of the precise acts required to be classified as an "author" under positive
law is beyond the scope of this article. For an excellent discussion of the concepts informing
"authorship" determinations under diverse regimes, see generally, Jane C. Ginsburg, The
Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 1063 (2003). I am
using authorship broadly to mean an individual or group of individuals who create an
aesthetic work. While I do not discuss the precise actions which give rise to a claim of
authorship, clearly authorship lies at the heart of any creativity analyses. More to the point,
while I do not support the purportedly "romantic" notion of authorship, my normative
assumption, for reasons explained in greater detail below, is that a focus on the human
creator of a work is proper and, indeed, necessary.
1-5 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.) (providing for the protection of "Books, and
other Writings").
16 See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 35-36
(1993).
17 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 201 (2000); see also WCT, supra note 5, arts. 6-8; TRIPs, supra note
4, art. 9; Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 5.
18 1 do not dispute that "cash 'n' carry" creativity has some facial desirability in today's
internet age. The concept of an automatic license for works posted on the internet with a
(possible) minimum payment to the author for the use in question has the strong appeal of
facial convenience and potentially reduced transaction costs. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. FISHER

III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 202 (2004)

(proposing a simplified "reward system"). What I contend is that such "cash 'n' carry"
convenience ultimately ill serves the primary goal of new work creation by directly
contradicting the impulses to aesthetic creativity.
19 See, e.g., id.; Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate
Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional Knowledge, in
INTERNATIONAL

PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER

OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 337, 349-50 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds.,
2005). I do not mean to suggest that Professors Reichman, Lewis, and Fisher advocate
reduction of authorial control to a pure "cash 'n' carry" level of protection. However, the
licensing scheme recommended by Professor Fisher and the liability rule system advocated by
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Before we can determine what the contours of copyright
protection should be in the twenty-first century, we need to
determine what authorship means in connection with the impulse to
create new works. Is authorship a value to be cherished and
encouraged because it represents some fount of creativity? If so, is
creativity encouraged through economic exploitation rights alone?
Or does authorship represent more than an economic relationship to
one's work? Does it represent a value of personality or individuality
that requires some form of legal protection, much as a person's
home requires protection against uninvited intruders, regardless of
its economic value? What type of legal protection is required?
Compensation?
Control?
Attribution?
Is authorship a legal
construct which has lost its meaning in today's Digital Age where
everyone is a "creator" and new works are created through digital
manipulation which any twelve-year-old can accomplish?
The
questions we face are broad and the answers are critical. There is
no doubt that, given today's vibrant reproductive culture, 20 issues
Professors Reichman and Lewis present a slippery slope to a "cash 'n' carry" protection system
where the only question regarding third party uses of copyrighted works would be "how much
compensation, if any, is the author entitled to?" FISHER, supra note 18, at 207; Reichman &
Lewis, supra, at 350. While "cash 'n' carry" creativity may well be "supported" by the
postmodernist deconstruction of authorship, such a protection system would ill serve the goals
of copyright to encourage the creation of new works. Infra Part II; see, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to enact federal copyright legislation "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts"); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003) (stating
that the goal of copyright law is to encourage the "creation and publication of new
expression"). The greater authorial control supported by this Article, however, does not
eliminate the ability to overcome such control through licenses and other contracts. It simply
means that such restrictions should generally be imposed only on agreement of the affected
parties.
20 See, e.g., ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES:
AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 6 (1998) (detailing various reproductive uses of
intellectual property); SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS: THE RISE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND How IT THREATENS CREATIVITY 1-4 (2001) (describing diverse
examples of copyright shortcomings in reproductive culture); Justin Hughes, "Recoding"
Intellectual Property and Overlooked Audience Interests, 77 TEX. L. REV. 923, 934-40 (1999)
(containing many examples of reproductive culture which he refers to as "recoding"). I do not
mean to suggest that reproduction is in any way an inappropriate or undesirable creative
activity. To the contrary, the inspirational "reproduction" of others' ideas and works has
served as the foundation for some of the most significant works of the Eastern and Western
Worlds. However, just as globalization predates its twenty-first century equivalent and yet is
different in the Digital Age, so too the nature of reproduction appears to have changed. When
Michelangelo copied the works of earlier Roman sculptors, he did so as part of a learning
process that ultimately led him to create re-imagined images that bore little resemblance to
the Roman inspirations of his work. See Ross KING, MICHELANGELO & THE POPE'S CEILING
151 (2003). Similarly, Shakespeare's well known use of others' works as inspiration for his
plays is well documented. See, e.g., R. A. Foakes, Introduction to WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
KING LEAR 90 (1997); Michael J. Madison, Comment, Where Does Creativity Come From? and
Other Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747, 760 (2003) (acknowledging the
rumors that Shakespeare is reputed to have borrowed extensively from diverse authors,
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about creativity, control, and the limits of the public domain may
have changed. At a minimum, the question has to be asked whether
a change has occurred to the extent that the "rules" for authorial
control need to be rewritten.
What I propose to do in this Article is examine the role of
authorship through the lens of technology and tradition to
determine what values must be included within a harmonized
copyright system of the twenty-first century to secure the continued
enrichment of the public domain through the creation of new works.
In this Article, 2 1 I have limited my analysis of "creativity" to
creative acts that result in works that represent aesthetic (as
opposed to innovative) creativity. I make the distinction for several
reasons.
First, aesthetic creativity-creativity used to create
novels, poetry, music, painting, sculpture, and other works based on
aesthetics-has been the focus of copyright protection since the
Statute of Anne 22 and is, therefore, a more appropriate focus for
inquiry regarding authorial control.
Second, and even more
importantly, aesthetic creativity more clearly reflects the type of
creativity whose productive output should be the subject of
copyright protection, as opposed to other forms of intellectual
property protection.
Aesthetic works more clearly contain
actors, and playwrights). Yet, few would dispute that the works which both Michelangelo and
Shakespeare created ultimately enriched the public domain, laying down truly new works
that have in turn inspired subsequent artists. Today, in light of the advances in reproductive
technology, inspirational reproduction is push button easy and in many instances does not
require the training or skill demonstrated by earlier reproductive works. I do not mean to
suggest that works created using such reproductive technologies lack creativity or are
unworthy of protection. I merely suggest that the level of reproduction allowed through such
digital technologies has radically altered the nature of inspirational reproduction, requiring a
renewed examination of the purpose and impact of copyright protection in the Digital Age.
21 This is the first in a series of anticipated articles that will examine the nature of
creativity and authorial/inventor control. Subsequent articles are intended to explore in
greater detail definitions of creativity (from diverse disciplines), as well as the distinctions
between creative as opposed to innovative acts, and the legal norms required to satisfy both.
As we better understand what "creativity" is and what causes some to "create," we may be
able to develop normative standards that more precisely meet the aesthetic creativity
incentivizing goals of copyright.
22 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 21 (Eng.). The Statute of Anne is generally recognized
as the first copyright law that recognized authors' rights in their works. Its protection was
limited to "Books and other Writings." Id. The first federal copyright statute, purportedly
based on the Statute of Anne, included non-aesthetic works, such as charts, among the
included categories of protected works. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124
(repealed 1802). The inclusion of such fact-based works under copyright protection has long
proven problematic, largely because of their lack of creativity. E.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344-46 (1991). Fact-based and innovation-based works,
such as computer software, and other technological-based works may be more appropriate
subjects for patent protection or other legal protection regimes where goals are to encourage
and/or reward technological innovation.
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expressive content whose unique voice may be lost if protection is
not provided to encourage the creation of works which embody that
23
voice.
In Part II, I examine the checkered history of authorial
protection, with particular emphasis on its early history as a
censorship device. In Part II, I explore some of the new teachings
about the nature of aesthetic creativity according to recent scientific
and psychological studies. In Part III, I focus on what I call the
"cash 'n' carry" nature of present copyright protection and what is
missing from this debate. In Part IV, I consider the concept of the
creative act in light of modern technological developments, as well
as post-structuralism's deconstruction of the author. In Part V, I
examine the nature of authorship as exemplified by non-traditional
means of protecting creativity, including through the burgeoning
international focus on the protection of traditional knowledge and
on moral rights for creative endeavors. Part VI follows with an
examination of the rights authors currently possess to determine
when and how to share their works with the public for the first
In Parts VII and VIII, I discuss the approaches of
time.
international human rights regimes to intellectual property rights,
as well as the impact of "cash 'n' carry" copyright on developing
nations and the need for a balance that protects the public domain
while assuring the ability of the developing world to partake of the
benefits of a growing audience for diverse cultural works. In Part
IX, I propose a revised authorial control mechanism that balances
both a heightened right of authorial control in certain areas and a
reduced level of control in the critical arena of derivative rights. To
achieve this balance, further studies on the impulse toward
aesthetic creativity need to be conducted to assure that the scope of
23 1 do not mean to suggest that innovative creativity---or more precisely the outputs of
such creativity-is less valuable or less worthy of protection under an appropriately
calibrated legal regime. I merely suggest that where the goal of protection is "expression" as
opposed to "invention" then aesthetic creativity more clearly falls within the types of impulses
the copyright regime was designed to encourage. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2000) (copyright
protection resides in "original works of authorship" and not in "any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery"), with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)
(patent protection extends to "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof'). For reasons that I am
continuing to develop, I also believe that errors in encouraging aesthetic creativity may be
less capable of remedy. Simply put, while innovative creativity should be encouraged because
it hastens technological and scientific advances, aesthetic creativity should also be encouraged
because a unique voice whose expression is once lost can never be recovered. History is rife
with evidence that scientific advances can be rediscovered-although admittedly with lengthy
intervals between the time of discovery that patent laws were purportedly designed to reduce.
By contrast, each person's voice is unique. Once silenced, it is lost forever.
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authorial control is no greater than required to achieve the goal of
incentivizing the creation of new works.
II. REMOVING THE SCARLET LETTER FROM COPYRIGHT'S TAWDRY

PAST
There is no debating that copyright has had a checkered past
internationally.
The first attempts to garner protection for
published works of authorship were the notorious printers' guilds
monopolies of the sixteenth century. 24 Protection was originally
granted in the form of exclusive "patents" granted to stationers for
the right to publish a particular manuscript. 25 The publisher, not
the author, was given a perpetual monopoly on the publication of
such tracts. 26 Behind such exclusive rights, however, was the ugly
stepsister of censorship. 27 Only works which were granted a license
could lawfully be published and subject to the stationers' exclusive
monopoly. 28 Thus, in its earliest stages, protection of published
works was designed to serve two purposes-to grant publishers an
economic incentive to print works for public distribution and to
29
censor works so that only "approved" works would be distributed.
While the Stationers' monopoly ended with the termination of the
Licensing Act, it was the Stationers Guild's continued efforts to reacquire their expired rights that ultimately led to the enactment of
the Statute of Anne, and its first formal recognition of author's
rights.30

This early censorship history was again at the forefront of the
next significant development in authorial rights in Western Europe
24

LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 6 (1968); ROSE, supra

note 16, at 12; Daniel J. Gervais, The Internationalizationof Intellectual Property: New
Challenges from the Very Old and the Very New, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.

L.J. 929, 933-34 (2002) (describing various guilds in France and Italy governing printers
rights); Tyler T. Ochoa & Mark Rose, The Anti-Monopoly Origins of the Patent and Copyright
Clause, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 909, 914 (2002).
25 PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 5; ROSE, supra note 16, at 11; Gervais, supra note 24, at

933; Ochoa & Rose, supra note 24, at 914.
26 PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 9; ROSE, supra note 16, at 12; Ochoa & Rose, supra note
24, at 914.
27 PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 6, 12; ROSE, supra note 16, at 12.
28 PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 5; ROSE, supra note 16, at 12; Ochoa & Rose, supra note
24, at 914.

29 PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 6, 12; ROSE, supra note 16, at 12. I do not dispute that the
Licensing Acts might also have served a competition purpose. See, e.g., Ochoa & Rose, supra
note 24, at 914 (explaining that when "the Licensing Act of 1662 expired, . . . the book trade
[was thrown] into disarray"). However, these market regulation purposes do not eliminate
the censoring aspect of the Acts.
30 PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 6-7; Ochoa & Rose, supra note 24, at 914.
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when, during the French Revolution, the royal publishing
prerogatives were abandoned. 3 1 Similar to the Licensing Act in
England, these prerogatives largely served to censor books that
failed to achieve royal favor (often due to either their political or
scatological content). 32 The experiment in eliminating all copyright
protections ultimately resulted in a publishing market in such
disarray 33 that authorial protection was reinstated-and in a form
that placed authors clearly at the center of control. 34 In fact,
reflecting the human dignity concerns of the French Revolution, the
"droits patrimoniaux" (economic rights) enunciated in the law of
July 19-24, 1793, expressed that authors' rights were not merely a
privilege of the sovereign but a natural right arising from the
authors' acts of creation. 35 This personality basis for placing
authors at the center of copyright subsequently served to extend
authorial control beyond the mere copying authorizations of the
British law and to grant expanded authorial control, including the
36
right of attribution and integrity under moral rights theories.
Copyright continues to be plagued with its tawdry past as a tool
for censorship. Even today, defenses based on free speech concerns
are routinely raised in copyright enforcement cases. 37 By its very
nature, copyright necessarily "restricts you from writing, painting,
31 CARLA HESSE, PUBLISHING AND CULTURAL POLITICS IN REVOLUTIONARY PARIS, 17891810, at 3 (1991).
32 ROBERT DARNTON, THE FORBIDDEN BEST-SELLERS OF PRE-REVOLUTIONARY FRANCE 4
(1995); HESSE, supra note 31, at 5, 11; Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary
Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 997-98 (1990).
33 HESSE, supra note 31, at 3-4.
3 Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 992, 1009-11 (describing the 1793 French Law intended to
protect the rights of the author)
35 Id. at 992; see also Daniel Bdcourt, The French Revolution and Authors'Rights: Towards
a New Universalism, 24 UNESCO COPYRIGHT BULL. 3, 4-5 (1990) (describing the approach to
copyright after the French Revolution and noting that the French "decree of 19 July 1793
deals with 'the property rights of authors"); Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Authors' Rights-Based
Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and American Law Compared, 24
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 549, 581 n.248 (2006) (noting the translation of "droits
patrimoniaux").
36 Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 992.
37 See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 198, 219-21 (2003) (rejecting a challenge to
the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 based on both the "limited times" restriction of the
Copyright Clause and the First Amendment, because the Act applies only to the author's form
of expression and not to the ideas themselves); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S.
569, 574-75 (1994) (addressing the issue of whether the rap group 2 Live Crew's song "Pretty
Woman" was a transformative parody of Roy Orbison's song "Oh, Pretty Woman" and thus
constituted a "fair use" within the meaning of the Copyright Act); Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 545-46 (1985) (stating that copyright is intended to
increase the exchange and sharing of knowledge, and not prevent it); Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434 (2d Cir. 2001) (confronting the issue of whether the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act constituted an unconstitutional burden on free speech).
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publicly performing, or otherwise communicating what you please" 38
in the precise manner in which you desire to express yourself, if
that manner of expression takes another's work as your own. 39 It is
this early historical role as a censorship device that continues to
plague copyright, and, I believe, explains in part the increasingly
hostile reaction to authorial control over copyright-protected works.
In order to achieve a useful harmonization standard for the
Twenty-First Century that deals effectively with the needs of
authors and end-users in the reproduction culture of the Digital
Age, we need to, at least, reduce the instinctive hostility toward
copyright based on its unfortunate parentage.
Even bastard
children in many societies are no longer stigmatized for their "illicit"
heritage. Copyright should be granted a similar reprieve. The
reality is that copyright, while still containing the potential seeds as
a tool for censorship, is also a tool for free speech. 4°
More
importantly, at least in the early stages of its development,
copyright was also perceived as a method for encouraging the
creation and dissemination of new works. The Statute of Anne
stated that authors were granted rights "for the Encouragement of
Learning. ' 41
The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution
similarly reflected this pro-development bent by affirming that
Congress had the right to grant such protection "[tlo promote the

38 Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual
Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 165-66 (1998).
39 Presumably other laws similarly restrict you from expressing yourself precisely as you
desire, including laws governing free speech, defamation, and trade secrets.
40 See, e.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, Censorship, Copyright, and Free Speech: Some
Tentative Skepticism About the Campaign to Impose First Amendment Restrictions on
Copyright Law, 2 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 17, 30-31 (2003) (analyzing the arguments
presented to support the contention that copyright laws pose a serious threat to the freedom
of speech); Doris Estelle Long, "Electronic Voting Rights and the DMCA: Another Blast from
the Digital Piratesor a Final Wake Up Call for Reform?", 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO. L. 533, 549-50 (2005) (presenting the unintended effects of legislation designed to
combat digital piracy on the fundamental rights to vote and to free speech); David McGowan,
Some Realism About the Free-Speech Critiqueof Copyright, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 435, 437-38
(2005) (discussing how copyright laws actually promote free speech and the problems with
free speech arguments to the contrary); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 218-19 (declining to apply
strict scrutiny in analyzing a free-speech challenge to the Copyright Extension Act of 1985);
Harper & Row, Publishers,Inc., 471 U.S. at 545-46 (interpreting the "fair use" provision of
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 and stating that copyright is intended to increase not
hinder free speech); cf. Rebecca Tushnet, Copyright as a Model for Free Speech Law: What
Copyright Has in Common with Anti-Pornography Laws, Campaign Finance Reform, and
Telecommunications Regulation, 42 B.C. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2000) (arguing free speech as a
justification for copyright laws by putting "copyright in a context of other free speech
doctrine").
41 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Eng.).
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Progress of Science and useful Arts." 42 This pro-development focus
has continued to be reflected in international developments in the
field of copyright and neighboring rights.
Even in its earliest manifestations, copyright law has been closely
linked to the issues of distribution and trade. 43 The Berne
Convention itself arose from the concerns of Victor Hugo and others
over the lack of sufficient international protection for their creative
endeavors. 44 The most evident declaration internationally of the
potentially pro-creative function of copyright may be the TRIPs
45
Agreement. Firmly founded in the utilitarian view of copyright,
TRIPs, in its preamble, stresses that the reason behind the treaty
was the members' "[d]esir[e] to reduce distortions and impediments
to international trade." 46 "Whether or not intellectual property laws
[including copyright] may be justified under theories of natural
law, 47 labor,48 or personality, 4 9 TRIPS establish[ed]
[an]
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 193 ("The dominant
idea in the minds of the framers of the Constitution appears to have been the promotion of
learning."); Ginsburg, supra note 32, at 999 (suggesting that the author's and inventor's
interests were subordinate to the public benefit). But see Ochoa & Rose, supra note 24, at
927-28 (suggesting that the true purpose behind the enactment of the Copyright Clause was
to combat monopolistic practices).
43 The Licensing Acts, which formed the focal point for the disputes that eventually gave
rise to the Statute of Anne, were, at their core, trade acts that granted certain publishers the
right to publish (trade in) certain authorized works. See Ochoa & Rose, supra note 24, at
914-15.
44 See generally SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886-1986, at 46-47 (1987) (discussing the history of the
Berne Convention including the early concern of authors over lack of international protection
for their works).
In 1878, the French Government organized an international literary
congress in Paris, convened under the Presidency of Victor Hugo. Id. at 46. These efforts

eventually evolved into the convening in 1883 of a conference in Berne, whose efforts resulted
in the establishment of the Berne Convention in 1886. Id. at 50-51. One of the key issues
addressed was the protection of works by foreign authors against a booming piracy business.
Id. at 51.
46 See, e.g., Long, "Democratizing"Globalization,supra note 11, at 243.
46 TRIPs, supra note 4, pmbl.
47 See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Essay, Human Rights and Copyright: The Introduction of
Natural Law Considerations into American Copyright Law, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 497, 498-501 (2004) (discussing the effect of Article 27 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which is based on natural law, on the United States
Constitution Copyright Clause, which is based on utilitarian considerations); A. Samuel Oddi,
TRIPS-Natural Rights and a "Polite Form of Economic Imperialism", 29 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 415, 417-18 (1996) (arguing that natural rights, derived from natural law,
have been the primary theory in the field of intellectual property law); Alfred C. Yen,

Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 517
(1990) (arguing for the "restoration of the natural law to our copyright jurisprudence"

(internal footnote omitted)). But see Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual
Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65, 66 (1997) (arguing against a natural law justification for
copyright law and instead advocating a Lockean model). See generally INTERNATIONAL
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY 141-47 (Anthony D'Amato & Doris Estelle Long eds.,
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international philosophy for their protection-utilitarianism, or
more precisely trade utilitarianism." 5 0 While the growing pirate
market for copyrighted goods demonstrates that "trade" does not
necessarily require in all cases that the creation of new works be at
the heart of trade in copyrighted works, without such new works to
replenish the marketplace (and the encouragement of their creation
through the appropriate legal regime), legal trade and its benefits,
including the establishment of viable culture industries which can
be used to assist developing countries in achieving sustainable
development, would be severely, if not fatally, curtailed.
As Kamil Idris, Director General of WIPO, recognized, intellectual
51
property is a "Power Tool for Economic Growth" for all countries.
"I[ntellectual] P[roperty] is native to all nations and relevant in all
cultures, and.., has contributed to the progress of societies.... [I]t
is a force that can be used to enrich the lives of individuals and the
future of nations-materially, culturally and socially." 52 The socalled "culture industries" of publishing, music, and films form a
53
significant source of market power for developed countries.
Shahid Alikhan's work, Socio-Economic Benefits of Intellectual
Property Protection in Developing Countries, demonstrates that
culture industries have served as a potent source for commercial
and industrial development. 54 These so-called culture industries are
directly impacted by the scope of protection granted to copyrighted
works. Without adequate incentives, new works, which are the fuel
for such culture industries, may not be created or, perhaps more
1996).
48 See generally INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY,

supra note 47, at

171-76 (citing many sources that discuss the problem of intellectual property protection for
works created in the course of an employment relationship); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of
Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 300-02 (1988) (providing several justifications for
ownership of intellectual property including Lockean labor theory); Yen, supra note 47, at
554-57 (discussing Lockean labor theory and the concept of a public domain for authoriship).
49 See generally INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY, supra note 47, at

171-76.
50 Long, "Democratizing"Globalization, supra note 11, at 243 (footnotes from original
omitted) (emphasis and footnotes added).
51 KAMIL IDRIS, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A POWER
TOOL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 1 (2d ed. 2003).

Id. at 2.
53 See id. at 23; see also SHAHID ALIKHAN, SOCIO-ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY PROTECTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 41 (2000) (discussing the economic value
of effective protection of intellectual property); Doris Estelle Long, First, "Let's Kill All the
Intellectual Property Lawyer&".- Musings on the Decline and Fall of the Intellectual Property
Empire, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 851, 871-72 (2001) (examining the current trends that are
reducing copyright protection domestically and abroad and citing diverse relevant sources
regarding the same).
52

54 ALIKHAN, supra note 53, at 41.
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significantly, may not be distributed for the benefit of the public at
large. 55 The critical question is the extent to which copyright (or
some other form of legal protection) actually supports the creation
and dissemination of new works.

II. CREATIVITY

- THE MISUNDERSTOOD MUSE

Creativity, like art, may be indefinable-premised largely on a
subjective view of the creator or viewer. As Marcel Duchamp
famously stated, "Anything is art if an artist says it is."5 6 Perhaps
creativity is what the creator says it is as well. Copyright, however,
has not been quite so generous. Even under U.S. law, which seems
to have one of the most lenient standards for creativity under
copyright law, only works which have a "modicum of creativity" are
Creativity similarly stands at the center of
protectable. 57
harmonized standards for international copyright protection. Thus,
for example, collections of factual information (databases) must only
58
be protected to the extent they constitute "intellectual creations."
Despite the centrality of creativity to present copyright regimes,
there is no unanimous decision on what qualifies as protectable
"creative effort." While "fine art" or "great literature" might be a
conceivable basis on which to discriminate between protectable
works, U.S. law has long rejected any such distinctions, at least on a
superficial basis. 59 Aside from the fundamental rule of thumb,
55 I do not mean to suggest that copyright protection should only be available for published
Publication, or some other form of public dissemination (through display or
works.
performance, for example) may be a function of market popularity. Works whose market
appeal may preclude commercial dissemination in one era, may prove popular in another. To
fashion copyright protection on the narrow border between publication and non-publication
may be an unwarranted restriction on authorial control. I also do not mean to suggest that
the presence of a strong copyright regime necessarily results in commercial development of
culture industries. There are numerous issues involved in development that are beyond the
scope of this article. Nevertheless, as Alikhan indicates, copyright protection is a necessary,
but not sufficient, requirement for the development of domestic culture industries. Id. at 4445.
56 Brief of Amici Curiae Brennan Center for Justice et al. in Support of Petitioners'
Request to Set Aside the FCC's Remand Order at 24, Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, No. 06-1760 (2d Cir. Nov. 30, 2006) (quoting Marcel Duchamp), available
at http://www.fepproject.org/courtbriefs/FoxvFCC.pdf.
57 Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). Moreover, the
protection of such works is limited to a period of the life of the author, plus seventy years. 17
U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
58 TRIPs, supra note 4, art. 10, para. 2. Although some countries, including the European
Union, provide protection for compilations which lack originality under sui generis regimes,
such protections are plainly outside the scope of works protected under copyright. See, e.g.,
Council Directive 2001/29, supra note 8, para. 47-48.
59 See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250-51 (1903) (proposing an
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which appears to be violated frequently when applied art or plastic
media are involved, 60 U.S. courts have been notably unhelpful in
establishing any sort of workable definition for protectable
"creativity" under copyright. According to the U.S. Supreme Court
"sweat" alone is insufficient. 6 1 Yet, some level of creative labor is
sufficient, particularly where that labor includes some type of
artistic judgment or intellectual choice. 62 At the international level,
creativity (or its more precise international term "intellectual
63
creation") is similarly lacking in definition.
This definitional void continues when more mundane sources are
considered. Wikipedia, the symbol of the collaborative culture of the
Digital Age, defines creativity as "a mental process involving the
generation of new ideas or concepts, or new associations between
existing ideas or concepts." 64 The Encyclopedia Britannica (online
version) defines creativity as the "[a]bility to produce something
new through imaginative skill, whether a new solution to a problem,
a new method or device, or a new artistic object or form." 65 Funk
and Wagnalls Standard Dictionary defines creativity as "[t]he
quality of being able to produce original work or ideas in any
field," 66 while the Oxford English Dictionary defines creativity as
"[c]reative power or faculty; ability to create." 67 Even Merriamanti-discrimination rule for the determination of whether a work is copyrightable without
regard to quality). Whether in fact courts are actually impacted by such determinations,
however, is an open question, particularly in cases where the media in which a work is
contained appears to have a direct impact on its protectable nature. See infra note 60 and
accompanying text.
60 See, e.g., Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1985)
(holding that department store mannequins were not subject to copyright protection); L.
Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that a plastic replica of
an antique bank was not protectable); Alva Studios, Inc. v. Winninger, 177 F. Supp. 265, 268
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) (holding that a plastic copied reduction of Rodin's Hand of God constituted an
infringement).
61 Feist Publ'ns Inc., 499 U.S. at 359-60.
62 Key Publ'ns, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publ'g Enters., Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512 (2d Cir.
1991) (finding compilation of Chinese-American businesses copyrightable); Kregos v.
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 704-05 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding compilation of baseball
statistics could not be said as a matter of law to be precluded from copyright protection).
63 See, e.g., infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
64 Wikipedia, Creativity, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creativity (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
65 Encyclopedia Britannica Concise, Creativity, http://www.concise.britannica.com/ebc
article-9361851/creativity (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
66 FUNK & WAGNALLS
STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 304
(international ed., 1965). It contains the same existential origination definition for "to
create" as the Oxford English Dictionary Supplement discussed infra note 67 and presents
the same lack of insight into the impulses behind the creative acts. Id. at 303.
67 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1135 (2d ed. 1989). It further defines "create" as "to
produce where nothing was before." Id. at 1134. While one of the definitions appears to
reflect the creative and innovative endeavors covered by current copyright and patent
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Webster's Online Dictionary defines creativity as "the quality of
being creative [or] the ability to create. 6 8 The circular reasoning
does not end with the dictionary definitions. Edward Albee himself
defined the essence of creativity as follows: "The thing that makes a
creative person is to be creative and that is all there is to it."69
Scientists, sociologists, and psychiatrists apparently have had no
greater success in determining what aesthetic creativity is or how to
encourage it.70 Creativity has been variously associated with frontal
lobe activity, 71 schizophrenia, 72 and "genius." 73 Analysis of "creative
regimes, its definition of "create" reflects the role of creation as existential origination,
establishing a definition that far exceeds even the modest legal threshold "modicum of
creativity" of present copyright regimes. It also gives no insight into the impulses behind the
creative activities it defines.
68 Merriam-Webster
Online Dictionary, Creativity, http://www.m.w.com/dictionary/
%20creativity (last visited Apr. 23, 2007). The identical definition is also contained in
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED
532 (1971) and in MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 293 (lth ed., 2005). These
dictionaries, however, provide slightly different definitions for "create." Webster's Third
defines "create" as "to bring into existence ...

to produce . . . along new or unconventional

lines," WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra, at 532, while MerriamWebster's defines "create" as "to produce through imaginative skill ... to make or bring into
existence something new," MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra, at 293. The
first definition seems to track a bit more closely the concept of innovative creativity, while the
second seems to include both innovative and aesthetic creativity. None of these definitions
provides much guidance as to the impulses behind the creative acts they define.
69 Robert J. Sternberg, Expert's Forum: Developing Creativity, DUKE GIFTED LETTER (Duke
Albee), available at
2001 (quoting Edward
N.C.), Summer
Univ., Durham,
http://www.dukegiftedletter.com/about-dgl/index.html.
70 This Article is not intended as an exhaustive overview of studies on creativity but is
merely intended to highlight some current scientific thoughts on creativity. In-depth studies
of the literature in the fields of science, psychology, and rhetoric could provide useful insights
into what triggers or nurtures aesthetic creativity, or at least into what areas should be
further investigated, but are beyond the scope of this article.
71 Fred Balzac, Sudden Emergence of Visual Creativity in Patients with Frontotemporal
at
available
2003,
June
REVS.,
NEUROPSYCHIATRY
4
Dementia,
Cruzan
Carol
http://www.neuropsychiatryreviews.com/junO3/junO3jrontotemporal.html;
Morton, Brain Regions May Sap or Spur Creativity, FOCUS, Dec. 12, 2003, available at
See generally ALICE W.
http://focus.hms.harvard.edu/2003/decl2_2OO3/neurology.html.
FLAHERTY, THE MIDNIGHT DISEASE: THE DRIVE TO WRITE, WRITER'S BLOCK, AND THE
CREATIVE BRAIN 147 (2004); John H. Flowers & Calvin P. Garbin, Creativity and Perception,
in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVITY 147, 147 (John A. Glover et al. eds., 1989) (noting the lack of
literature on the topic of creativity and perception); Anne Stahl, Till Death Do Us Part: The
Marriage of Art and Madness, chap. 4 (Apr. 1994) (unpublished thesis, Dun Laoghaire College
of Art and Design), available at http://www.annestahl.com/thesis/index.htm.
72 ANTONIO
PRETI, THE GIFT OF SATURN: CREATIVITY AND PSYCHOPATHOLOGY,
http://serendip.brynmawr.edu/serendipia/Serendipia-Preti.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2007);
JASON STUART RATCLIFF, SCHIZOPHRENIA AND HUMAN NATURE, at Part 3 (2002),
http://www.angelhaunt.net/schizophrenia/sandhn.htm; James Claude Jackson, Exploring the
Relationship Between Schizophrenia, Affective Illness, and Creativity, at iii (Aug. 2001)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Rosemead School of Psychology, Biola University), available
at http://eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2/contenstorage_01/000/00Odb80/0d83/IO.pff.
73 MICHAEL MICHALKO, CRACKING CREATIVITY: THE SECRETS OF CREATIVE GENIUS 2
(2001); DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, GENIUS AND CREATIVITY: SELECTED PAPERS 79 (1997); Tracy
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processes" indicates that little is known about how the so-called
"flash of genius" that imbues the concept of creativity with so much
mysticism occurs. Despite the claim in a recent article of Scientific
American Mind that "[p]iece by piece, researchers are uncovering
the secrets of creative thinking," 74 the reality is that although much
more scientific study has been directed in recent years to
"knowledge management" and creative processes, including
discovering which portions of the brain are implicated in creative
thinking-the distinction between so-called right hemisphere and
left hemisphere activity 75-the
precise triggers that result in
creative thought remain unclear. Even more unfortunate, scientific
and psychological studies of creativity do not presently appear to
differentiate between aesthetic and innovative creativity, making it
difficult to determine the precise impulses which lead authors,
artists, and others to create aesthetic works.
Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi studied ninety-one creative individuals in the
1990s to determine what gives rise to the creative impulse, which he
defined as "a process by which a symbolic domain in the culture is
changed." 76 He described ten "polarities," integration of which he
determined was present in creative people. 77 These "polarities"
included "generalized libidinal energy" and restraint, convergent
and divergent thinking, and fantasy and reality.7 8 Unfortunately,
however, this impulse toward fantasy, imagination, or innovation
does not explain why certain individuals create aesthetic works
while others do not. Since the goal of copyright is to encourage the
creation and dissemination of such works, encouraging the impulse
toward aesthetic creativity should be the focus of authorial rights

V. Wilson, How Geniuses Work, http://people.howstuffworks.comlgenius.htm (last visited Apr.
23, 2007).
74 Ulrich Kraft, Unleashing Creativity, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN MIND, April 2005, at 17.
75 BETTY EDWARDS, DRAWING ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF THE BRAIN: A COURSE IN ENHANCING
CREATIVITY AND ARTISTIC CONFIDENCE 26 (rev. ed. 1989); Roger W. Sperry, Nobel Lecture:

Some Effects of Disconnecting the Cerebral Hemispheres (Dec. 8, 1981), available at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/medicine/laureates/1981/sperry-lecture.html.
76 MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, CREATIVITY: FLOW AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY AND
INVENTION 8, 12 (1996). Among the people whom Dr. Csikszentmihalyi included within his
study were artists, musicians, actors, physicists, psychologists, and chemists. Id. at 12-14.
He did not differentiate between aesthetic and innovative creative processes. Id. at 12.
77 Id. at 76.
78 Id. at 57-65. Others have described additional characteristics which may be indicative
of creativity, including sustained curiosity, dedication, willingness to work, and asymmetrical
thinking. Charles L. Owen, Speech at the International Conference on Design Research and
Education for the Future: Design Thinking. What It Is. Why It Is Different. Where It Has
New Value. 10-11 (Oct. 21, 2005), availableat http://www.id.iit.edu/papers/owenkorea05.pdf.
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granted in such works.7 9 That does not mean that innovative
creativity is not valuable, or may not even be caused by some of the
same impulses toward aesthetic creativity. But given the different
types of works produced by aesthetic, as compared to innovative,
creativity, we cannot assume that the same impulses produce these
works.
Further examination of the impulses toward aesthetic
creativity is required so that authorial control can be better
calibrated.
Carl Jung indicated that we are all "creative" in some manner,
positing that creativity is one of the fundamental impulses in man,
closely tied with the animus and anima archetypes8 0
Poststructural condemnations of the concept of individuated authorship
also place creativity within everyone's potentialities. According to
Roland Barthes in his seminal work The Death of the Author: "The
reader is the space on which all the quotations that make up a
writing are inscribed without any of them being lost; a text's unity
lies not in its origin but in its destination."8'
Under this poststructuralist view of the interpretive process of textual
appropriation, creativity is necessarily a collaborative process.
Language may be selected by the author, but that selection is only
one-half of the "creative process."
The second half is the
interpretation of the indeterminate text of the author.
Such
interpretive meaning is not derived from subjective authorial
consciousness. To the contrary, it is the result of each reader's own
consciousness and experiences. Thus, under the broadest teachings,
each of us is engaged in the creative process each time we read a
book or view a painting.8 2 Michel Foucault's "What is an Author?"83
79 i do not mean to suggest that the doctrine of election is necessarily implicated as a result
of the dichotomous drives of innovative and aesthetic creativity. Certain works may implicate
both types of creativity. Such crossovers, however, may prove to be more limited than current
practice indicates. Thus, for example, software for operating systems may prove to be
creatures of innovative creativity where impulses should be encouraged under patent
regimes-not copyright. Until the relationship between innovative creativity and software
creation is more fully understood, elimination of the doctrine of election may be premature.
See generally Long, supra note 53, at 879-94 (discussing the implications of the doctrine of
election on various types of intellectual property, including copyright).
80 CARL G. JUNG, MAN AND HIS SYMBOLS 216 (M.-L. von Franz et al. eds., 1964); see also
Kraft, supra note 74, at 18 (quoting Psychology Professor Steven M. Smith as stating:
"Creative thinking is the norm in human beings and can be observed in almost all mental
activities.").
K1 ROLAND BARTHES, The Death of the Author, in IMAGE, MUSIc, TEXT 142, 148 (Stephen

Heath trans., 1977).
82 See Martha Woodmansee,

On the Author Effect: Recovering Collectivity, in THE

CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP: TEXTUAL APPROPRIATION IN LAW AND LITERATURE 15, 24-28

(Martha Woodmansee & Peter Jaszi eds., 1994) (discussing the history of collaborative
authorship); infra note 115 (citing works that discuss the feminist critique of authorship); see
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can ultimately be answered with an equally simple response:
"Everyone."
Even if we may all be potential authors whose every work might
qualify as "creative," there is no question that not all creative works
are equal. I don't mean to suggest that future copyright protection
should incorporate a value judgment regarding whether the creation
of the work in question specifically promotes the progress of
science 8 4 or possesses a uniqueness of vision to improve the future
public domain. Not only is such line drawing unworkable, it is
undesirable. Just as tastes change, so too may the progresspromotional value of works. What I do mean to suggest, however, is
that not all creative works are equal in their value to the public
domain. Although to a certain extent the ideas behind all works are
necessarily derivative, their expression may not be. It is this
expressive value which copyright seeks to promote because it is this
expressive value which enriches the public domain for others to use.
Shakespeare's poetry, Michelangelo's sculpture, and Dadaist
collages were all so critical to the "progress of science" because they
inspired others to look at the world in new ways and communicate
that vision in new expressions. While we cannot hope to distinguish
predictably which works may have the same progressive importance
in the future, we at least know that one of our goals must be to
ensure that such types of works are encouraged. A future standard
that limits its goals solely or largely to encouraging reproductive
creativity, such as Duchamp's Mona Lisa8 5 or Koons' String of
Puppies,8 6 would ultimately impoverish the public domain for future
generations. Even though criticism of past works through parody,
also DARIAN LEADER, STEALING THE MONA LISA: WHAT ART STOPS US FROM SEEING 89 (2002)

(noting the role of the receiver of works in the creation of art); Doris Estelle Long, Protecting
Diversity in the Global Information Ecosystem: A Post Structural Analysis of Folklore,
Authorship and the Marginalization of Indigenous Creativity (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (discussing the "changing nature of authorship in today's postmodernist
world").
83

MICHEL FOUCAULT, What Is An Author?, in THE FOUCAULT READER 101, 101 (Paul

Rabinow ed., 1984).
84 1 am using the term "science" in the broad sense in which it was used in U.S. colonial
copyright statutes and in the Copyright Act of 1790-to encourage the promotion of education,
learning, and arts-and not in the more modern sense of innovative creativity. Copyright Act
of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802); see PATTERSON, supra note 24, at 197 (describing
the purposes of the Copyright Act of 1790).
85 See E. Kenly Ames, Note, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A Fair Use Standard for
Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1483-84 (1993) (describing how Dadaist Marcel
Duchamp parodied the Mona Lisa by adorning a cheap reproduction with a moustache and a
goatee).
86 See Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 305 (2d Cir. 1992); Ames, supra note 85, at 1473.
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collage, or reconfigurations is important, it cannot be the only type
of work or even the most important type of work whose creation
copyright should seek to promote. While labels can be problematic
and rhetoric can impede analysis, the reality is that, regardless of
the policy upon which you rely to support some form of public
domain, or even how large you believe that public domain should be,
the public domain undeniably nurtures the development of future
works.
It must be strengthened and nourished, but such
nourishment should not be at the cost of encouraging creative works
which will expand the creative domain for future generations.
While our own creative spark should be encouraged, future legal
regimes must be careful to encourage not merely reproductive
creativity, but also the enrichment of creativity if the public domain
is to remain a vibrant source for future creative endeavors.
87
III MONEY FOR NOTHIN' AND CHECKS FOR FREE

Since aesthetic creativity, or more precisely the method for
sparking aesthetic creativity, is currently so poorly understood,
early legal regimes cannot be faulted for using the monetary
incentives of economic exploitation rights as a method for
encouraging the creation of new aesthetic works. Yet, not all works
are created based upon the carrot of money if the work achieves
some critical or market-based success. 8 8 Based upon informal
surveys I have engaged in with students and artists, the extent to
which money actually incentivizes the creation of new works
depends on a multiplicity of factors, including the nature of the
work, its complexity, and its commercial appeal. Certain types of
work that are highly individualistic in nature, including songs,
poetry, novels, paintings, and photography, are often created by
authors with little thought as to the economic reward available for
DIRE STRAITS, Money ForNothing, on BROTHERS IN ARMS (Warner Bros. Records 1985).
88 As Jessica Litman wisely recognized: "If payment were the most important consideration
• most [authors] would probably not write anything at all-they'd be doing something more
remunerative with their talents and their time." Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance
(Or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 249 (19961997); see also Bradford S. Simon, Intellectual Property and Traditional Knowledge: A
Psychological Approach to Conflicting Claims of Creativity in International Law, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1613, 1626-27 (2005) (demonstrating that external rewards may not be
a predominant incentive for creativity). This does not mean, however, that economic
compensation does not play a role in encouraging individuals to devote greater time to
aesthetic creative endeavors. Absent compensation, creators could not obtain a livelihood
solely from their aesthetic activities. They would have to engage in other professions,
necessarily reducing their artistic output.
87
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such works. I do not mean to suggest that such works may not be
created solely for personal profit, as in the instance of an individual
who pursues a career as a photographer or songwriter. I merely
contend that the potential for such profit is not necessarily required
in order to encourage individuals to create such works. Thus, there
is at least some category of work that would be created regardless of
legal protections. For these works then, copyright cannot really be
said to fulfill any role in encouraging their creation.8 9 (It may,
however, be useful in encouraging the public dissemination of such
works). 90
Other categories of complex, collaborative works tend to be
created generally only if some form of reward is available to
encourage their creation. Most artists and students generally do
not create software programs, video games, motion pictures, or
other works whose creation requires the collaboration of several
people without financial support or the promise of future payment
for their efforts. That does not mean that there are not individuals
who will not participate in the creation of such works without
monetary compensation.
Open Source 91 and other public
collaborative works, such as Linux 92 and Wikipedia, 93 are strong
indications to the contrary. But, it does suggest that the number of
creative individuals who will participate in such efforts is relatively
89 History is ripe with aesthetic creative endeavors undertaken when copyright protection
did not exist, including the creation of numerous literary, artistic, and musical works during
the Renaissance, and the creations of such monumental works as the Mahabharata and
Bhagavad-Gita in South Asia, the Analects of Confucius in China, and the Thousand and One
Nights in the Middle East.

See TERESA M. AMABILE, CREATIVITY IN CONTEXT 15 (1996)

(discussing the role of "intrinsic motivation" in eliciting creativity); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall,
Inspirationand Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1945, 1970-72 (2006) (discussing non-economic inspirations for creative works); infra
note 124.
90 Even if copyright protection does not directly serve to encourage the creation of new
works, similar to the Stationers' Acts from which copyright protection originally sprang, such
protection serves to encourage the monetary investment required to disseminate such works.
See supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text (describing the Stationers' Acts). While the
development of digital media of communication, including the internet, may have reduced the
costs of such dissemination, it has not eliminated them. Although an analysis of the
distributed costs of copyrighted works on the internet are beyond the scope of this article, it
should be noted that such costs are not at zero. Moreover, from the point of view of
international copyright protection, given the lack of significant internet penetration in many
countries, and the high costs of internet access in others, traditional distribution techniques
with their concurrent high transaction costs remain necessary activities to be encouraged
under copyright regimes.
91 Open Source Initiative, Home Page, http://www.opensource.org/ (last visited Apr. 23,
2007).

Linux Online, Home Page, http://www.linux.org/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
93 Wikipedia, Home Page, http://www.wikipedia.org/ (last visited Apr. 23, 2007).
92
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small.
Finally, while the focus of this Article is on the role of copyright in
actually encouraging the creation of new works, their public
dissemination must be considered as a significant subsidiary goal.
If all of the creative works which we seek to encourage remained
moldering in desk drawers and hidden in artists' studios, then
"science" would not progress.
At some level the public
dissemination of works must be considered as a subsidiary goal of
copyright protection. Economic exploitation rights clearly provide
publishers, producers, broadcasters, and manufacturers with an
incentive to disseminate popular works. Yet, I would suggest that
where commercialization is the goal, economic exploitation rights
might serve to do more than merely incentivize distribution. Where
works need to be perfected in order for their usefulness or
accessibility to be enhanced, such as in the case of video games,
economic exploitation rights may also serve to encourage such
perfection prior to marketing.
While people may willingly
collaborate to create software, they may be less willing to spend the
time and creative labor debugging such software or creating user
interfaces that make the software accessible to the less
technologically adept among us. There is a good reason why Linux
remains largely inaccessible to most consumers. Large specialeffect,
multi-collaborative
films (the so-called "Hollywood
blockbuster") similarly require economic incentives for such large
94
scale investments of time and money.
While it is undeniable that the offer of economic exploitation
rights may help incentivize aesthetic creativity in certain cases, the
utility of such motivation does not necessarily mean that money is
the only incentive to be used or that the only form of authorial
control which should be granted is the right to monetary
compensation for unauthorized uses. The creative act must be
respected and the author's relationship to her work honored in order
to encourage creative people to engage in creative acts.

94 I do not mean to suggest that "blockbusters" are better or worse then "indie" films. To
the contrary, both serve important roles in expanding the public domain. A system which
encourages one type of film to the exclusion of the other would result in a culturally deprived
public domain. The fact that many such large budget movies fail to make a profit does not
reduce the significance of the commercial distribution incentive in copyright. There is no
present indication that authors must be guaranteed an economic recovery to encourage their
creative efforts, although clearly for some creators a guaranteed salary or other source of
income may be required for them to devote significant time to creative endeavors.
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HONORING THE CREATIVE ACT

In today's technological, post-structuralist world, creative effort
has been devalued to the point where money appears to be the only
compensation to which an author is entitled. Scholarship regarding
the balance to be struck between authors' and end users' "rights"
has been extensive and is not easily quantifiable. Over the past
several decades numerous challenges have strongly criticized the
long-standing property-based paradigm of authorial rights. Over
time, authorship as the center of creative activity has been
questioned. 95 The evolution of fair use from an occasional equitable
exception to authorial control 96 to a public right 97 has been
championed. The public domain as a created "commons" has been
urged, 98 re-constituted into a regulatory access mechanism, 99 and
95 See Keith Aoki, Adrift in the Intertext: Authorship and Audience "Recoding" RightsComment on Robert H. Rotstein, "Beyond Metaphor: Copyright Infringement and the Fiction of
Work", 68 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 805, 824-25 (1993); Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and
Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 132227 (1996); Peter Jaszi, On the Author Effect: Contemporary Copyright and Collective
Creativity, 10 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 293, 302 (1992).
See generally, e.g., THE
CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 82, at 13 (containing a collection of articles "to
revive interdisciplinary investigation of our ways of conceptualizing creative production").
96 See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (noting
that "a fair and bona fide abridgment of the work" is not a violation of copyright laws).
97 See, e.g., Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996) (setting
forth, in dicta, the opinion of Judge Stanley Birch that fair use "is better viewed as a right");
L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF USER'S
RIGHTS 193-96 (1991) (stating that personal use of copyrighted work does not violate the
copyright); Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29,
33-34 (1994) (arguing that "before we succumb to calls for further enhancement of the rights
in the copyright bundle, we need to reexamine the intellectual property bargain from the
vantage point of the public, on whose behalf, after all, the copyright deal is said to be struck
in the first place"); Judge Stanley Birch, The Brace Lecture at New York University:
Copyright Fair Use: A Constitutional Imperative 39-40 (Nov. 1, 2006), available at
www.csusa.org/pdf/brace-2006_lecture.pdf (contending that without provision for fair use, the
Copyright Act of 1976 would be unconstitutional).
98 See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, WHITE PAPER FOR THE FIRST AMENDMENT PROGRAM,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE AT N.Y.U. SCH. OF LAW, PROPERTY, COMMONS, AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT:

TOWARDS

A

CORE

COMMON

INFRASTRUCTURE

7-8

(2001),

available at

http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/commons/paper-benkler2.pdf
(discussing the care that must be taken to ensure that legislation and regulations controlling
information production and exchange do not impede the First Amendment); LAWRENCE
LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN
CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 18-19 (2004) (arguing that "[t]he burden of this law now
vastly outweighs any original benefit"); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First
Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 361-63
(1999) (arguing that public domain enclosure threatens free speech).
99 See, e.g., James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the
Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 36-37 (2003) (discussing property rights
created by the state).
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ultimately championed as a source of creative endeavor whose
protection is nearly more important than those of the original
author. 10 0 In fact, depending on the technology at issue, copyright is
often seen as the stumbling block to creativity, where authorial
rights impede the creation of new works no matter how reproductive
such works may be. 10 1 Over time, copyright in the Digital Age has
become the villain of free speech,10 2 whose only value may be a
limited compensation right designed to free creative works from the
shackles of authorial control.10 3 The reproductive culture of the
Digital Age has both profited from, and fueled, this spiraling
descent.
Part of the explanation for the current disrepute in which
copyright finds itself is due to the integral nature of copyright to
content on the internet and in all other forms of digital
communication. Copyright continues to be the form of intellectual
property protection that is most often used to control content of
everything: from webpages,10 4 to search engine results; 10 5 from the
software that runs the computers at the heart of the internet,1 0 6 to
the databases that make the internet such a valuable research
tool.1 07 Any form of expression that becomes so useful is bound to
find itself under attack. Copyright regimes have also managed to
stumble when faced with technological advances that alter business
100See, e.g., FISHER III, supra note 18, at 7-8 (proposing three alternatives to the current
copyright system); Reichman & Lewis, supra note 19, at 345.
101 LESSIG, supra note 98, at 19-20; Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs,94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2312 (1994) (arguing for a
new legal regime).
102 See, e.g., Hon. Marybeth Peters, Copyright Enters the Public Domain, 51 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y U.S.A. 701, 728 (2004) (urging the adoption of "[a] more sensible approach" to copyright
enforcement by the courts).
103 FISHER III, supra note 18, at 8-9; Reichman & Lewis, supra note 19, at 345, 365.
104 See, e.g., Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp.
1361, 1365-67 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (suit against website creator and his internet service provider
for copyright infringement).
105 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 948 (9th Cir. 2002), superseded, 336
F.3d 811, 822 (9th Cir. 2003) (originally holding that use of full size copyrighted images by a
search engine constituted copyright infringement, then holding that "thumbnail" images
constituted fair use); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 831, 859 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
(granting plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction against Google and barring use of
plaintiffs copyrighted pictures on Google's search engine), rev'd, 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007)
(following the same fair use reasoning as Kelly to uphold use of pictures on search engine).
106 See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1243 (3d
Cir. 1983) (granting Apple a preliminary injunction which prevented defendant from
"copying ... Apple's operating system computer programs").
107 See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 341 (1991) (holding
that compilations such as telephone directories are copyrightable if their facts have been
"selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship") (emphasis and internal citation omitted).
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models and force long standing culture industries to reconstitute
themselves. 0 8 No one appreciates creative destruction 09 and the
culture industries of the United States (and other developed
countries) have shown no greater fondness for it than any other
industry which discovers that communicative technological
developments have passed them by. As Marybeth Peters, Register
of Copyrights in the U.S., so poignantly (and I would suggest, so
presciently) pointed out, the pyrrhic victory of the Copyright Term
Extension Act, which added an additional twenty years to preexisting copyrighted works," 0 served as a rallying cry for the
copywrong forces:
Whatever the merits of term extension-and the merits in
terms of copyright principles were slim-term extension
helped to mobilize an outcry against copyright law that has
gone on to address issues far beyond term extension
itself.... The day may come when even the most aggressive
copyright owner rues the day that term extension was
passed, because the fallout may outweigh whatever benefit
copyright owners might ultimately receive."1 1 '
Copyright, however, has been on a collision course with the public
domain for a long time. This collision course is the natural result of
a steady erosion in the value accorded the creative act.
It seems contradictory to use the terms "post-structuralism" and
"authorship" in the same breath. Admittedly, at the heart of poststructuralism is a deconstruction, even a rejection, of the construct
11 2
of authorship as presenting some kind of creative, conscious act.
A full exposition of the focus on language over consciousness, and
words over text, that lie at the heart of the post-structuralist
philosophy of creation is beyond the scope of this Article. When,
108 The history of the culture industries' standard reaction to technological change has
been well documented. Whenever a new format arises, the original reaction has been to avoid
the technology, condemn it when it appears inevitable, and later embrace the technology
when its profit potential has been appreciated. Thus, for example, the uses of both television
and video recordings were challenged initially, then ultimately embraced, by the motion
picture industry. FM broadcasts and digital audio recorders met similar fates from the
recording industry. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 98, at 19-20 (arguing that the burdens on
creativity outweigh the benefits of copyright protection); Kevin M. Lemley, The Innovative
Medium Defense: A Doctrine to Promote the Multiple Goals of Copyright in the Wake of
Advancing Digital Technologies, 110 PENN ST. L. REV. 111, 112-13 (2005) (promoting a
balance between regulation and innovation).
109 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (3d ed. 1950).
110 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998).

,11 Peters, supra note 102, at 710-11.
For a good general background on post-modernism and post-structuralism, see
generally THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO POSTMODERNISM (Stuart Sim ed., 2d ed. 2005).
112

HeinOnline -- 70 Alb. L. Rev. 1187 2006-2007

1188

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 70

however, one of the key works entitled "What Is an Author?"'113
replies by condemning the concept of authorial consciousness, and
another announces "The Death of the Author,"'1 4 you get a sense of
the level of rejection of constructs of authorship as representative of
individuated creative genius." 5 Under this post-structuralist view
of the interpretive process of textual appropriation, aesthetic
creativity is necessarily a collaborative process. Language may be
selected, consciously or unconsciously depending on where you
stand on the post-structuralist/postmodernist spectrum, but that
selection is only half of the creative process. The second half is the
interpretation of the indeterminate text of the author.
Such
interpretive meaning is not derived from the subjective authorial
consciousness. To the contrary, it is the result of each reader's own
16
consciousness and experiences.
FOUCAULT, supra note 83, at 101.
BARTHES, supra note 81, at 142.
115 The individuated role of authorship has also been attacked under a feminist perspective
on intellectual property. See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender,
Feminism, and Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 551, 554 (2006); Ann
Bartow, Women in the Web of Secondary Copyright Liability and internet Filtering,32 N. KY.
L. REV. 449, 449-50 (2005); Dan L. Burk, Copyright and Feminism in Digital Media, 14 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 519, 521-22 (2006); Debora Halbert, Feminist Interpretationsof
Intellectual Property, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 431, 433-34 (2006).
While it is difficult to categorize the nature of the challenge given the creative newness of
feminist studies on intellectual property, it would appear that the feminist challenge is not
based on a denigration of creative processes itself, but instead posits a concept of authorship
that incorporates relational theories of creativity leading to a broader definition of
collaborative work. Burk, supra, at 52-24. Developing feminist critiques on authorship also
appear to be based on concerns over male-dominated power structures represented by
patriarchal individuated originality and the "propertization" of authorial works. Id. at 54647; see also Shelley Wright, A Feminist Exploration of the Legal Protection of Art, 7 CAN. J.
WOMEN & L. 59, 70 (1994) (arguing that copyright laws are not gender-neutral). Given the
early stage of feminist criticism of intellectual property, it is difficult to determine the precise
contours that feminist critiques of authorship may take. Scholars in the area have already
noted the conflicting views regarding feminist goals and male power domains. See, e.g., Burk,
supra, at 544-48 (discussing divergences in feminist theory generally); Halbert, supra, at
451-52 ("While some feminists problematize the construction of authorship, others may
suggest that owning property is itself an important feminist right."). There is a strong
argument that a feminist critique of authorship may well support the present arguably
patrimonial authorship concept because women artists, authors, and other creators have the
growing power to participate in the culture industries. See, e.g., Halbert, supra, at 433-34.
In addition, it would appear that feminist perspectives on valuing feminine works and the
perceived nurturing and spiritual nature of women-created art may actually support stronger
considerations of ethical, moral rights-type regimes.
See, e.g., Burk, supra, at 524
("[Fleminine experience may lend itself to collective and collaborative understanding, rather
than to the individual and confrontational understanding that characterizes patriarchy.").
116 See generally STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 67 (1980) (dissecting the effect of language on the reader);
BARTHES, supra note 81, at 146 ("We know now that a text is not a line of words releasing a
single 'theological' meaning ... but a multi-dimensional space in which a variety of writings,
none of them original, blend and clash."); Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The
113
114
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Thus, under post-structural analysis, literature is not the result
(if it ever was) of an author's individuated originality. 1 7 Instead, it
is the result of intertextuality-of a collaboration between author
and reader that goes beyond the reader merely reading the words
selected by another.'1 8 The centrality of the reader's role in the
creative process, as the interpreter of textual meaning, has the
potential to tip the balance between author and the public almost
exclusively in favor of the public interest. Since the role of authorial
consciousness is diminished under a post-structuralist view of
creativity, the need for a putative author's ability to control the
economic exploitation of her work through the property rights of
copyright appears similarly diminished. If all creativity, therefore,
involves appropriation, then a fortiori appropriation is creative. 1 9
Following this construct to its logical conclusion, if every
appropriation is creative, then nothing is "not creative." Ultimately,
creativity itself becomes a meaningless construct.
Technology has made the determination of what acts of creativity
should qualify as protectable even more difficult. Technology quite
simply enables all of us to appropriate greater elements of prior
works with greater ease. As John Leland recognized: "The digital
sampling device has changed not only the sound of pop music, but
also the mythology. It has done what punk rock threatened to do:
made everybody into a potential musician .. .. "120 David Sanjek
similarly acknowledges in his article "Don't Have to DJ No More":
Sampling and the 'Autonomous" Creator:

Metamorphoses of 'Authorship," 1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 502 (discussing the interplay between
the development of copyright law and the variable definition of authorship); Hannibal Travis,
Google Book Search and Fair Use: iTunes for Authors, or Napster for Books?, 61 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 87, 101 (2006) (arguing that Google's book use constitutes a fair use and is not copyright
infringement); Woodmansee, supra note 82, at 25 (exploring the evolving process of writing
and its implications on the law).
117 Often expressed as the need to find one's voice.
118 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
119 Such creative appropriation is recognized in cases such as Feist Publications, Inc.,
where selection of the elements to appropriate may itself form the basis for a claim of
originality. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 356-57 (1991). Similarly,
appropriated materials that are translated into different media or styles may result in a
protectable work. Cf. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589 (1994) (holding
that even though the opening riff and copied first line of a rock song were duplicated, the rap
parody did not substantially copy the original ballad); Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d
Cir. 2006) (deciding that defendant's appropriation of a portion of plaintiffs photograph was
transformative and, thus, a fair use).
120 David Sanjek, "Don't Have to DJ No More" Sampling and the 'Autonomous" Creator,
reprinted in THE CONSTRUCTION OF AUTHORSHIP, supra note 82, at 345 (quoting John Leland,
Singles, SPIN, August 1988).
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[I]t should be evident that the elevation of all consumers to
potential creators thereby denies the composer or musician
an aura of autonomy and authenticity. If anyone with an
available library of recordings, a grasp of recorded musical
history, and talent for ingenious collage can call themselves a
creator of music, is it the case that the process and the
product no longer possess the meanings once assigned
12
them? 1
John Leland, in addressing the issue of digital musical sampling,
echoes this concern over the impact of postmodernist views of
creativity and authorship, when he states in his article in SPIN:
"Being good on the sampler is often a matter of knowing what to
sample, what pieces to lift off what records; you learn the trade by
listening to music, which makes it an extension more of fandom
122
than musicianship."
At its heart, copyright should be directed toward encouraging
"musicianship" as well as "sampling."
In drawing the lines
regarding the scope of rights to be granted to an author in this
Digital Age, we must not craft authorial control so narrowly as to
threaten "musicianship," nor favor reproductive creativity over
enriching creativity.
While the author may not be the sole
determinative of the meaning of a work, intertextuality does not
remove the author from his/her central position in the creation of
new works. To the contrary, without a work to interpret, without
the initial words or paint to react to, such intertextuality-and more
precisely the public's role in the interpretive process-could not
occur.
V. PERSONALITY AND RELATIONSHIP AS MEANS OF ENCOURAGING
CREATIVITY

Authors often express their relationship to their works in highly
personal terms that are not bound by economic considerations. The
instinct to create and the sense of creative ownership over their
works are often closely bound up with the creative vision. Thus, for
example, Michelangelo often spoke of drawing the image out of the
stone that was already within the marble he sculpted. 123 Writers
121

Id.

Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting John Leland, Singles, SPIN, August 1988).
See BrainyQuote.com, Michelangelo Quotes, http://www.brainyquote.comlquotes/
authors/mmichelangelo.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2007) ("I saw the angel in the marble and
carved until I set him free."). See generally JOHN Ross, MICHELANGELO AND THE POPE'S
CEILING (Pimlico 2003) (discussing Michelangelo's views of creativity).
122
123
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similarly discuss their works in terms of crafting a story whose
characters take over the action. In essence, the stories write
themselves. 124 The author is merely the individual who has been
gifted with the ability to translate the characters' wishes into
125
readable prose.
This sense of a personal relationship between the creator and his
or her work and the valuing of this relationship as enduring outside
the economic underpinnings of copyright is expressed most clearly
through moral rights legislation. Under a moral rights regime, such
as the one embodied in Article 6bis of the Berne Convention,1 26 the
author's connection with a work exists even after copyright has been
transferred. Such a personal relationship requires more than credit
or even compensation. To the contrary, as a moral rights regime
recognizes, it requires a sense of control over what happens to an
author's work. 127
124

MADELEINE LENGLE, WALKING ON WATER: REFLECTIONS ON FAITH & ART 185 (1980)

(discussing a writer's inability to change a character's fate); STEPHEN KING, ON WRITING 163
(2000) (noting that stories "pretty much make themselves"); Kwall, supra note 89, at 1957
(discussing the connection between creativity and self-abnegation); Interview by Stephen
Capen with Paulo Coelho in S.F., Cal. (Oct. 14, 1995), http://www.worldmind.com
CannonlCulture[Interviews/coelho.html (discussing how part of The Alchemist wrote itself);
Interview by Fans with Anne Rice, http://www.randomhouse.com/features/annerice/
interview.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (explaining how Lestat "took over" The Vampire
Chronicles); Fiction Debut Author Roundtable, http://www.authorsontheweb.com/features/
0206-debut/debut-ql.asp (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (diverse authors describe how they were
driven
by their own creations to write); Q & A with Bruce Bauman,
http://www.brucebauman.net/qa.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (discussing how "the
characters demanded the story take on the life it did").
125 See, e.g., Kwall, supra note 89, at 1965-66 (discussing notion of creativity as a divine
gift derived from an external source).
126 Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 6bis (requires protection of the "non-economic"
rights of patrimony and integrity). Given its greatest level of protection domestically in civil
law countries, moral rights protection not only allows authors and artists to protect the
integrity of their works against harmful alterations, it also allows creators to withdraw their
works from publication under certain circumstances and guarantees authors the right to
control the first publication of their works. See generally INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY ANTHOLOGY, supra note 47, at 85-93 (explaining modern tendency to rely on
neighboring rights, as opposed to expanding copyright law, to protect intellectual property
with advances in technology); see also infra note 131; James M. Treece, American Law
Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 487, 487 (1968) (contemplating
whether there are comparable American legal protections for the moral rights that France
has recognized).
127 See Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a) (2000); Kwall, supra note 89, at
1992-93; see also Thomas F. Cotter, Pragmatism,Economics, and the Droit Moral, 76 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 85 (1997) (evaluating the complexity of moral rights and their implications on the
arts); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, "Author-Stories" Narrative'sImplications for Moral Rights
and Copyright's Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2001) (suggesting
moral rights are strongly connected with protecting authorial dignity); Raymond Sarraute,
Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP.
L. 465, 478 (1968) (discussing the two main elements of France's equivalent to copyright law).
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Authorial control is more than a metaphysical desire. Some
artists' visions are so closely tied to their personal relationship with
a work that they actively maintain installations, 128 remove
deteriorating works from public view, 129 or even decline to sell most
130
of their works during their lifetime.
A lack of authorial control, in fact, may actually result in a
1 31
disincentive for artists to create new works in certain instances.
Thus, for example, Bruce Connor, a well-known collage artist,
stopped creating collages in 1964 because he feared loss of control
over his work and identity.1 32 While Bruce Connor chose not to
create in the face of lack of control over his work, Terry Yumbulul
was faced with a far more serious consequence when his attempt to
prevent a deculturizing use of a morning star pole he created
resulted in threatened expulsion from his tribe with consequential
prohibition against creating further works.1 33 Under the traditions
128 For example, Damien Hirst volunteered to replace the decaying tiger shark in his
installation entitled "The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living."
Carol Vogel, Swimming With Famous Dead Sharks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at 228.
129 Christo and Jeanne-Claude removed their installation Valley Curtain in 1972 in Rifle,
Colorado, after only twenty-eight hours when a gale was reported. See JONATHAN FINEBERG,

CHRISTO AND JEANNE-CLAUDE: ON THE WAY TO THE GATES, CENTRAL PARK, NEW YORK CITY

32 (2004); Christo and Jeanne-Claude Biography, http://www.christojeanneclaude.netl
bio.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007). Similarly, during their famous "The Gates" installation
in Central Park, the artists paid for workers to install and remove the gates as well as answer
questions and hand out fabric swatches. See generally Christo and Jeanne-Claude, The
Gates, http://www.christojeanneclaude.net/tg.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (discussing
"The Gates" project). But cf. Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d 608, 613-14 (7th Cir.
1999) (affirming contract giving artist the right of removal on the decision to remove or alter
an installation).
130 Mary Sue Schneeberg is an example of an artist who retained most of her artistic
output, declining to display works publicly during her lifetime. David Siders & Nancy Brome,
Schneeberg's Modesty Kept Paintings Hidden Only Family Saw Some of Her Works,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Aug. 16, 2001, at B2. Many artists have similarly declined to sell
their works. See, e.g., Teddy Ng, Village Woman Paints Unusual Story, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 27,
2007, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-01/27/content_794276.htm (Chang
Xiufeng, referred to as "Grandmother van Gogh," declines to sell her works); Glenn O'Brien,
Cream of Wheat Paste, ARTFORUM, Mar. 1994, at 76 (Revs, a well-known graffiti artist,
refuses to sell work).
131 This does not mean that authorial control must be "absolute" or that fair use should not
continue to mediate between authorial control and socially beneficial free uses. But it does
mean that the fair use doctrine should be applied in an equitable manner to assure that the
encouragement of authors to create new works is not unduly restricted.
132 John P. Bowles, The Bruce Conner Story Continues, ART J., Spring 2000. This loss of
control was tied in part to the consumer demands of the modern art market, but also
underscores the very real loss that a diminished authorial right may have on new work
creation. Id.
133 See Yumbulul v. Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481; see also Milpurrurru v.
Indofurn Pty. Ltd. (1994) 54 F.C.R. 240, 245 (discussing how indigenous artists could be
threatened with expulsion because their tribal designs were incorporated into carpets without
permission).
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of the tribe, the knowledge and art which Terry Yumbulul both used
to create the morning star pole, as well as the pole itself, belonged to
the tribe as a collective right. If expulsion had occurred, he would
have lost the right to practice his art, including any rights to his
13 4
previous work.
On its face, there may be a distinction between the personal
relationship of a sole author under Western regimes, and the
generally collective ownership regimes of traditional knowledge
holders like Terry Yumbulul. This distinction at its core, however,
is largely one of degree. The reactions of the collective to the
deculturizing use of their work are no less heartfelt or personal than
those of individual artists. 13 5 This personal relationship supports
the view that authorial control must provide for more than an
opportunity for compensation (or credit).
Given the personal nature of many creative acts, any diminution
in authorial control must be carefully circumscribed and must
include recognition of the personality rights of the artist to assure
that creation is not discouraged. 136 These personality rights do not
13 Milpurrurru,54 F.C.R. at 246.
135 See, e.g., MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 45 (2003) (analyzing the

debate and status of the world's indigenous societies fighting to protect their traditional
knowledge); CROSS-CULTURAL CONSUMPTION: GLOBAL MARKETS, LOCAL REALITIES 12-13
(David Howes ed., 1996) (discussing the "marketization of culture"); WORLD INTELLECTUAL
PROP. ORG., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEEDS AND EXPECTATIONS OF TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE HOLDERS: WIPO REPORT ON FACT-FINDING MISSIONS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (1998-1999), at 6-7 (2001), available at
http://www.wipo.int/tk/enitklffm/report/final/pdf/partl.pdf (reporting on the needs and
expectations of creators in the traditional literary, artistic, or scientific fields through a study
of various worldwide regions); Doris Estelle Long, The Impact of Foreign Investment on
Indigenous Culture:An Intellectual PropertyPerspective, 23 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 229,
244-46 (1998) (confronting the "commodification" of culture in the twentieth century). While
in Panama in August 2006, I spoke with a woman from the Embera tribe who described her
personal sense of loss when she saw "sacred" objects sold in marketplaces to non-Embera
members.
136 This concern over the protection of the personal relationship between an artist and her
work is not diminished by the corporate ownership of certain works under work for hire or
corporate assignment doctrines. As many countries recognize, at the heart of any work for
hire is an individual artist with a personal relationship to the work. While in cases of work
for hire the presence of compensation seems to be the primary motivating factor in the
creation of new works, the number of cases involving challenges to subsequent unforeseen
uses of such works indicates that compensation alone is not the sole motivation for creation.
Thus, for example, John Huston's estate successfully challenged the unauthorized broadcast
of a colorized version of his film, THE ASPHALT JUNGLE (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1950), in
France because such colorization harmed his artistic vision. See Huston v. La Cinq, Cour de
Cassation, JCP 1991 II 21731 (Fr.); Turner Entm't Co. v. Huston, Cour d'appel [CA] [regional
court of appeal] Versailles, Dec. 19, 1994, civ. ch., No. 68, Roll 615/92, available at
http://peteryu.com/intip/turner.pdf. More recently, numerous directors challenged editing
software which could be used to edit out objectionable words and scenes. Huntsman v.
Soderbergh, No. Civ. A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 17,
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necessarily require the full grant of moral rights protection provided
under continental protection regimes 137 but, as explained more fully
below, 138 require revised protection for the rights of integrity and
disclosure (first publication). While the grant of such rights may
restrict certain unauthorized future uses of an artist's work, so long
as such rights are not absolute, they form a critical element in the
encouragement of the creation of new works.
VI. PRIVACY AND THE ARTISTIC IMPERATIVE

The need to assure that authorial control must include more than
a right to compensation is further supported by the growing
awareness of the privacy issues that are implicated in the
publication, display, or performance of an individual's work. Most
importantly, the issue of control over the first appearance of a work,
whether through publication, performance, or display, becomes
critical. 139 Such control not only values the author's relationship to
his work, but recognizes the individual's right to protect private
thoughts and personal musings from public scrutiny until the artist
is ready to share her work.
The widespread popularity of the internet has lead to the
increasing threat of publication of works without control by their
artists and authors. Bootleg recordings, master tapes, and even
pirate manuscripts find their way onto websites and into the public
before the copyright owner has authorized such use. 140 The issue is
2005). The challenges ultimately resulted in several of the software companies filing a
declaratory judgment action. Id. After passage of the Family Movie Act of 2005, Pub L. No.
109-9, 119 Stat. 218, 222, the court dismissed the claims involving the unauthorized editing of
the movies in question. Huntsman, 2005 WL 1993421, at *2.
137 For example, I am opposed to any extension of the grant of withdrawal. See supra note
126. Such withdrawal is unnecessary if an artist has been granted the right to determine
first publication of her work. Moreover, most moral rights regimes grant rights that last
beyond the author's lifetime. For reasons discussed more thoroughly below, some rights, such
as first publication, should end with the author's death. See infra Part IX.
138 See infra Part IX.

139 Regardless of demand or public interest, artists have consistently refused to deliver or
display works unless, and until, they believe the work is completed. See, e.g., FINEBERG,
supra note 129, at 3, 7; STANLEY WEINTRAUB, WHISTLER: A BIOGRAPHY 131 (1974).
140 In response to this problem, Congress enacted the Artists' Rights and Theft Prevention
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-9, 119 Stat. 218 (codified in scattered sections of titles 2, 15, 17,
18, 28, and 36 of the U.S.C.), which imposed criminal and civil liability for unauthorized
reproduction and/or distribution of a "work being prepared for commercial distribution." 17
U.S.C. § 506(a)(1)(C) (2005). Despite these efforts, figures on piracy remain staggering, if not
precisely verifiable.
See, e.g., Bush Creates New Post to Fight Global Piracy,
TECHREPUBLIC.COM, July 22, 2005, available at http://articles.techrepublic.com.com21001009-5800092.html (reporting the U.S. Department of Commerce's estimate of an annual loss
of $250 billion in business revenue from global piracy).
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not merely the lost sales that may result from such distributions,
but the loss of the author's right or ability to control how, when, and
if her work is seen.
The right to control the first publication has long been recognized
as a critical element of moral rights internationally, even though
141
such a right has not yet made it into international standards.
The U.S. approach, recognizing that any such first publication right
does not prevent fair use, may be an adequate compromise so long
as the unpublished nature of the work is given sufficient weight in
1 42
any fair use determination.
While it appears Congress added the
sentence regarding unpublished works to avoid a per se prohibition
against any fair use involving an unpublished work, 143 the House
Report stresses that Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, which treated the unpublished nature of President
1 44
Ford's memoirs as a key factor in negating a fair use defense,
remains valid precedent for fair use determinations: "The general
principles regarding fair use of unpublished works set forth by the
Supreme Court in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises still
145
apply."
Current cases indicate that the unpublished nature of the
materials may tip the scales on the second statutory factor-the
nature of the copyright work 146-but ultimately does not appear to
be given any particular significance in deciding fair use. In a
typical case, NXIVM Corporation v. The Ross Institute, the court
was faced with the unauthorized posting of portions of copyrighted
business training seminar materials.1 47 The unpublished nature of
14, France, Mexico, and Ukraine are among the countries which recognize a nearly
absolute right of first publication. Compare Berne Convention, supra note 4, art. 6bis (stating
no right of first publication required), with 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (implying first publication
is a factor but does not prevent a fair use defense from being successfully mounted).
142 Under section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act, the statute expressly provides: "The fact
that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made
upon consideration of all the above [statutory] factors." 17 U.S.C. § 107. Created in response
to the court's decision in Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 1987),
involving the "first publication" (although not the first public access) of certain Salinger
letters in a biography, and similar cases which prohibited any use of unpublished materials
as a "fair" one, this sentence was added to section 107 by the Fair Use of Unpublished Works
Amendment, Pub L. No. 102-492, 106 Stat. 3145 (1992). The purpose of the amendment
according to the legislative history was "to clarify the intent of Congress that there be no per
se rule barring claims of fair use of published works." H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 1-2 (1992),
reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2553, 2553.
143 H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 2.
144 471 U.S. 539, 595 n.19, 599-600 (1985).
145 H.R. REP. No. 102-836, at 9.
146 17 U.S.C. § 107 (the second statutory factor is "the nature of the copyrighted work").
147 364 F.3d 471, 475-76 (2d Cir. 2004).

HeinOnline -- 70 Alb. L. Rev. 1195 2006-2007

1196

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 70

the materials was not disputed. 148 After citing the divergent views
50
of the amendment to section 107149 and the Harper & Row case,1
the court, without analysis, upheld the district court's
determination that the second statutory factor "favor[ed]
plaintiffs." 1'5 1 The unpublished nature, however, did not tip the
balance in the plaintiffs favor.
To the contrary, the
"transformative" use of the materials intended as a form of criticism
152
was stressed in concluding that defendant's use was fair.
To date, since the 1992 Fair Use Amendment, numerous cases
have dealt with unpublished works, but few of these works had
actually been "undistributed" prior to the defendants' allegedly
infringing actions. The closest case dealing with unauthorized
"publication" of an unpublished manuscript appears to be Bond v.
Blum.15 3 The use of plaintiffs unpublished manuscript in a child
custody case was found to be fair:
Where, as here, the use of the work is not related to its mode
of expression but rather to its historical facts and there is no
evidence that the use of Bond's manuscript in the state legal
proceedings would adversely affect the potential market for
the manuscript, one cannot say the incentive for creativity has
154
been diminished in any sense.
The acknowledgement of the critical relationship between first
publication and creativity is a valid step in assuring that in cases of
truly unpublished works-i.e., those which have not been publicly
distributed or made available to the public-authorial control is
maintained, absent exigent circumstances. As the court in Bond
148 Id. at 480. The materials were not undistributed. They were "unpublished" because
their distribution was limited to those who signed confidentiality agreements. Id. at 475.
14917 U.S.C. § 107.
150 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
151NXIVM Corp., 364 F.3d at 480.
152 Id. at 486-87 (relying on the transformative nature of use to defend ultimate conclusion
of fair use); see also Chicago Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 626, 629 (7th Cir.
2003) (quasi-secret nature of secure tests did not prevent fair use); Nufiez v. Caribbean Int'l
News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that defendant's new use of unpublished
photographs was sufficiently transformative to protect him under the fair use provision);
Payne v. The Courier-Journal, No. Civ.A. 3:04CV-488-R, 2005 WL 1287434, at *3 (W.D. Ky.
May 31, 2005) (holding that use of an unpublished manuscript in an autobiographical context
was transformative and, thus, protected under fair use provisions); Shell v. City of Radford,
351 F. Supp. 2d 510, 513 (W.D. Va. 2005) (holding that photographs obtained in a police
investigation and used by police constituted fair use); Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp.,
973 F. Supp. 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (use of unpublished photographs in a film was
transformative in that the photographs were used to create "a distinct visual aesthetic and
overall mood").
153 317 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 2003).
154 Id. at 396.
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failure to apply the greater deference
Row, 15 5 may erode the creation incentive of
artists fear a loss of control over the critical
156
the work is actually a completed one.

VII. TEACHINGS FROM THE HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME
Much recent literature focuses on the desaggregating impact of
the human rights regime on the ability of an intellectual property
owner to control the use of his work, particularly in the area of
Cultural
and agro-chemical inventions. 157
pharmaceutical
155 471 U.S. at 564.
156 History is ripe with tales of authors who either destroyed their own drafts or left orders
for such drafts and other unpublished manuscripts and journals to be destroyed. Robert
Louis Stevenson, for example, notoriously burned drafts of his works, including the first draft
of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. Random House, Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, About This Book,
http://www.randomhouse.com/catalog/display.pperl?isbn=9780553212778 (last visited Apr. 24,
2007). Agatha Christie went so far as to kill one of her principal detectives in a novel written
more than twenty years prior to its publication date to avoid having him be co-opted after her
http:/fbiblio.com/authors/603/
Biography,
Christie
Agatha
See
death.
AgathaChristie_Biography.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007). First publication rights would
support the authors' demonstrated desire to control public access to their creations. Such
first publication right, however, would appear to become less critical after the artist's death.
There is historical value in unpublished manuscripts, which give us a critical insight into the
creative processes. Once an artist is no longer alive, and therefore no longer available to
determine whether or if his work is a completed one, the first publication right no longer
seems necessary. Accord Dennis S. Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya Grotter, and the Copyright
Derivative Work, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 17, 37-40 (2006) (advocating limiting an author's control
over derivatives to her lifetime). While it is arguable that an artist might decide not to create
if he could not have absolute control over the future of all created works, even after his
lifetime when his legacy would presumably be protected by his estate, the few artists who fall
into this category do not warrant extending the right of first publication beyond the author's
death. This does not mean that other doctrines more firmly situated within the general area
of law dealing with personal privacy might not prevent such unauthorized publications of
letters and other personal information. Such protection, however, is outside the focus of this
article-that is, an analysis of the protection of creative values to assure continued creation of
new works and maintenance of a vibrant public domain.
157 Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Human Rights Res.
2000/7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2[Res/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000); see, e.g., Obijiofor Aginam,
Between Life and Profit: Global Governance and the Trilogy of Human Rights, Public Health
and PharmaceuticalPatents, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 901, 902-04 (2006) (arguing that
pharmaceutical patents and free trade initiatives have marginalized public health
imperatives, especially in the context of the global AIDS emergency); Keith Aoki, Weeds,
Seeds & Deeds: Recent Skirmishes in the Seed Wars, 11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 247, 249
(2003) (discussing the conflicting views towards the patentability of plant species and
describing how this is a particularly fierce debate in the context of globalization because of
human rights and ethical concerns); Wesley A. Cann, Jr., On the Relationship Between
Intellectual Property Rights and the Need of Less-Developed Countries for Access to
Pharmaceuticals: Creating a Legal Duty to Supply Under a Theory of Progressive Global
Constitutionalism, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 755, 761 (2004) (discussing how TRIPs has
affected the abilities of poor countries to treat and prevent HIV/AIDS); Jim Chen, Biodiversity
and Biotechnology: A Misunderstood Relation, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 51, 56 (2005)
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appropriation, through deculturalizing commodification, however,
has become an increasing source of significant criticism among
international agencies and scholars in the human rights arena. 158
Such critiques, however, do not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that human rights and intellectual property rights regimes are
polar opposites. To the contrary, many human rights documents
actually support intellectual property protection as a method for
assuring the recognized human right to participate in one's
culture. 159 Such participation rights include an express recognition
160
of authorial rights to their created works.
(explaining how the global south, which is rich in biodiversity, blames northern notions of
intellectual property for exploiting their biological resources); Amit Gupta, Patent Rights on
PharmaceuticalProducts and Affordable Drugs: Can TRIPS Provide a Solution?, 2 BUFF.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 127, 131 (2004) (discussing whether TRIPs harms the ability of countries
to promote health with respect to pharmaceutical patents and suggesting changes that should
be made within the TRIPs agreement); Helfer, supra note 11, at 4-6 (explaining how the
global expansion of intellectual property rights has created concerns in several areas of public
policy, including public health, which in turn has caused international "regime shifting" to
help manage the complexities in the changing environment); Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and
Beyond: A Considerationof Socio-Cultural Conflicts with Global Patent Policies, 39 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 433, 435-36 (2006) (describing the conflict between western nations and
developing nations with respect to "biopiracy"); Dennis S. Karjala, Biotech Patents and
Indigenous Peoples, 7 MINN. J. L. ScI. & TECH. 483, 486-88, 505-07 (2006) (discussing how
patent rights in biotechnology affect the concerns of indigenous peoples); David Weissbrodt &
Kell Schoff, Human Rights Approach to Intellectual Property Protection: The Genesis and
Application of Sub-Commission Resolution 2000/7, 5 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 32 (2003)
(describing the adoption of Resolution 2000/7 by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights that
called for the consideration of human rights norms in the context of international intellectual
property regimes).
158 See, e.g., BROWN, supra note 135, at 44-47 (noting the positive effects on Australian
aborigines after the Australian courts ruled that aboriginal artists deserved copyright
protection, which had previously been disallowed because of the "folkloric" nature of the art);
CROSS-CULTURAL CONSUMPTION: GLOBAL MARKETS, LOCAL REALITIES, supra note 135, at
142-43, 149 (arguing that the Hopi Native American tribe should have been able to prevent
Marvel Comics from using their cultural images); Jean Raymond Homere, Intellectual
Property Rights Can Help Stimulate the Economic Development of Least Developed Countries,
27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 277, 278 (2004) (arguing that the international intellectual property
community should integrate protection of traditional knowledge into the TRIPs agreement);
Long, supra note 135, at 239 (describing the threat of globalization to native and indigenous
cultures and offering potential solutions based in intellectual property law); Doris Estelle
Long, Traditional Knowledge and the Fight For the Public Domain, 5 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 617, 620-21 (2006) (arguing that there should be better intellectual property
protection for "traditional knowledge"); Angela R. Riley, "Straight Stealing" Towards an
Indigenous System of Cultural PropertyProtection, 80 WASH. L. REV. 69, 80 (2005) (criticizing
the widespread use of indigenous peoples' culture as offensive and noting the lack of copyright
protection available).
159 See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), art. 15, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 27, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
160 See generally Afori, supra note 47, at 503-04 (stating that authors have a natural right
to the results of their labor); Dr. Peter Drahos, The Universality of Intellectual Property
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Thus, Article 27 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
recognizes that "[e]veryone has the right freely to participate in the
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in
scientific advancement and its benefits." 161 Article 27 goes on to
affirm that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of the moral
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author."162 Similarly, Article
15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights recognizes "the right of everyone" to "take part in cultural
life" and to "benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production
of which he is the author."163 While these regimes do not specify the
type of protection that authors should be accorded, they clearly
demonstrate that some form of authorial control is required as a
matter of human right. Moreover, since these treaties speak of
protection of "moral . . . interests,"164 clearly more than
compensation must be provided to authors. The issue of whether
copyright can qualify as a human right, given its potentially positive
law origins, is beyond the scope of this Article.
What these
documents demonstrate, however, is an underlying assumption
regarding a creator's relationship to his work. In the creation of a
workable international standard for authorial control, any such
standard should be informed by the human rights treatment of such
control.
While overly strong intellectual property regimes may severely
limit cultural participation by restricting certain modes and images
of communication, 165 an unduly weakened intellectual property
rights system may well deny the recognized right of cultural
participation, particularly if such denial is combined with a
continued refusal to protect previously excluded works of aesthetic
creativity, including works of traditional cultural expression. If
participation in a culture includes the right of authors to have their
Rights: Origins and Development, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1999),
available at http://www.wipo.int/tk/en/hr/paneldiscussion/papers/pdf/drahos.pdf (providing a
history of intellectual property doctrines and emphasizing the importance of information in
the modern world); Robert L. Ostergard Jr., Intellectual Property:A Universal Human Right?,
21 HUM. RTS. Q. 156, 161-62 (1999).
161

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 159, art. 27.

162

Id.

163

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 159, art.

15.
164

Id.

165

See COOMBE, supra note 20, at 209; CROSS-CULTURAL CONSUMPTION: GLOBAL MARKETS,

LOCAL REALITIES, supra note 135, at 150-51.
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"moral and material interests" in their works protected, then per se
exclusion from the public domain based on an exclusively Western
construct of what such interests should represent is problematic to
say the least. Human rights regimes may further provide useful
guidance in the form of expanded appreciation for collectively
managed/owned rights in works of aesthetic creativity. 166 Such
regimes may also provide a basis for enhancing protection for
previously excluded voices, including works of indigenous peoples
based on traditional knowledge and gender arts. 6 7 At a minimum,
they remind us that authorial control is a critical element of a
cultural life.
VIII. SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE DIGITAL CULTURAL

DIVIDE
Much of the current literature about copyright protection in the
Digital Age assumes that the costs of production and distribution
have been so significantly diminished by the possibilities of digital
communication that concerns about protection of the dissemination
enhancing values of copyright are, at worst, an impediment and, at
best, an irrelevancy in crafting global harmonization standards.
The Draft A2K Treaty, and its rejection of any expansion of
copyright-protectable categories (including those necessary to
include previously excluded voices, such as works reflecting
traditional knowledge), 168 seems to be similarly based on the
assumption that reducing copyright protection will open the
expanded "cultural commons" to a broader playing field. There is
an equivalent assumption that a reduction in copyright protection
will result in across-the-board expanded end user access. In other
words, all end users will benefit equally from a reduced protection

166 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text (discussing Terry Yumbulul and the
collective nature of much traditional knowledge).
167 Many of the works which have been traditionally excluded from present intellectual
property regimes include works representing the so-called hearth arts, including dressmaking
and other sewing arts, and recipes and food preparation. See, e.g., Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v.
Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1996) (recipes); Fashion Originators Guild of Am. v.
FTC, 114 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1940) (dressmakers).
168 See Consumer Project on Tech., Treaty on Access to Knowledge: Draft, art. 3-7, (May 9,
2005), available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k-treaty-may9.pdf (providing that "works
lacking in creativity should not be subject to copyright or copyright-like protections"). Such
limitation would presumably include any attempt to extend copyright or sui-generis
protection to cover previously excluded works of traditional knowledge.
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regime. Any such expansion, however, only continues the inequality
169
of the digital cultural divide.
In the developed world, discourse on internet public policy focuses
largely on the Westernized concern over the balance to be struck
between private rights (generally protected under trademark and
copyright laws) and public access to "information." This focus
reflects a cultural bias that excludes or marginalizes most of the
world's cultures and concerns, in favor of the same debate over
private rights that has marginalized many cultures' nontechnological innovation and creativity.
As Gail Hawisher and Cynthia Selfe demonstrate in their
introduction to Global Literacies and the World-Wide Web,
cyberspace is largely Anglo-centric in nature. 170
This Anglocentricity, which admittedly has its roots in history, 7 1 includes the
use of English as the primary language of the Net, "the economic
and political ordering of Web resources at the service of capitalism,
democracy, and other free-market forces," and "reliance on
westernized instantiations of authorship, visual design, text, and
representation."' 172 Fortunately, non-English web sites are coming
into existence in greater numbers. Despite this hopeful sign, Anglocentric methods of communication remain embedded in the
operational structure of the Web.
Debates by western nations over the replacement of outdated
distribution techniques for albums, films, software, literature, and
other copyrighted material to take advantage of the Digital Age
ignore the multinational impact of the elimination of traditional
media. Increasingly, defenders of currently unauthorized uses of
copyrighted work on the internet assert that the creation of digital
distribution systems provide transactional cost reductions that
validate a reconfiguration of authorial rights. 73 The assumption
169 See, e.g., Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1347 (2004) (noting that the current state of intellectual property law
"favors the Western world").
170 Gail E. Hawisher & Cynthia L. Selfe, Introduction to GLOBAL LITERACIES AND THE
WORLD-WIDE WEB 1-10 (Gail E. Hawisher & Cynthia L. Selfe eds., 2000).
171 Originally developed from the ARPANET program by the U.S. Department of Defense,
it makes sense that the internet would be Anglo-centric in language and structure in its

incipiency.

See, e.g., BARRY M. LEINER ET AL., INTERNET SOCIETY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE

INTERNET (2003), available at http://www.isoc.org/internetthistoryfbrief.shtml#Origins
(describing the early stages of the internet and its progression to the world wide web and the
system we know today). Given the global reach of the internet, however, such Anglocentricity, or more precisely the limits which such Anglo-centricity imposes, is no longer
justifiable.
172 Hawisher & Selfe, supra note 170, at 9.
173 Numerous defenders of internet piracy have suggested that once record companies
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that digital distribution will and should replace hard goods
distribution systems ignores a fundamental truth of the internet. It
"If 'hard' sources of goods and
is not available to everyone.
information are removed or significantly reduced in favor of the lure
of cyber-information, the economic have-nots will be rapidly
transformed into informational have-nots, with catastrophic results
174
in today's increasingly globalized information economy."
Reluctance to re-examine Western-based assumptions about key
legal issues surrounding the internet will only serve to continue the
marginalization of "the Other" from yet another domain of literacy.
Just as current intellectual property regimes reward technological
and individual creativity over non-technological and communitarian
efforts, 175 so too the debate over internet policy favors technology
over culture. By denigrating the value of protecting intellectual
property because of its relatively easy accessibility in digital form
and by emphasizing that the solution to the exponentially
increasing unauthorized use of copyrighted works on the internet is
less protection or more digital distribution, legal policy threatens to
undermine current efforts to fashion international remedies that
protect traditional knowledge, folklore, and other forms of
indigenous innovation and cultural expression. 176 If works of
individual authors, which fit within the narrow constraints of
traditional forms of intellectual property, are no longer worthy of
strong protection and should be relatively freely exploitable without
constraint, how can the cultural expressions of indigenous peoples
be safe from deculturizing exploitation? Even more problematic
from a trade development point of view, less intellectual property
protection may also mean less opportunity for developing countries
to create viable domestic culture industries. 177 The so-called
"culture industries" of publishing, music, and films increasingly
develop inexpensive digital distribution systems, piracy will shrink. See generally Doris
Estelle Long, Intellectual Property on the Internet and the Cultural Digital Divide, in THE
IMPACT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ON GLOBALIZATION SUPPLEMENT: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND SOCIAL NEEDS IN A NETWORKED WORLD 10, 12 (Santa Clara Univ. Ctr. for

Science, Tech., & Society, STS NEXUS Issue No. 3.2 Supp., 2003), available at
http://www.scu.edu/sts/nexus/upload/3.2%20supplement.pdf (discussing the digital divide
between westernized nations and the rest of the world).
174Id. at 12.
175 See, e.g., Long, supra note 135, at 244-47 (discussing dilemmas faced by developing
nations).
176 See generally WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., supra note 135, at 5-8 (discussing
many attempts to protect the non-technological "traditional knowledge" of diverse countries
and cultures and the lack of international protection regimes for this form of intellectual
property).
177 See IDRIS, supra note 51, at 16.
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form a significant source of market power for developing
countries. 178 They are the easiest to nurture because aesthetic
creativity, unlike scientific or technological innovation, does not
require a particular educational background or a level of technical
achievement.
Numerous developing countries have successfully
used copyright protection to develop domestic cultural industries
based on the production and dissemination of copyrighted works.
These industries, in turn, have aided in increasing gross domestic
production, ultimately helping countries in their efforts at creating
sustainable economic growth. 179 Yet, if copyright protection is
reduced for the sake of digital convenience, we may be condemning
others to fewer economic opportunities in the future, not more.
An international standard incorporating "cash 'n' carry" creativity
would also fail to provide developing countries with the necessary
tools to reverse harms of commodification of cultural works by
outside distributors in ways that are either deculturizing or that
deprive authors of compensation for their underlying works.1 80 To a
certain extent, the protection of traditional knowledge is an issue
concerning wealth transfer. If the creative aspects of traditional
cultural expressions were protected similarly to the works protected
under present copyright regimes, there is no question that a certain
amount of wealth transfer would occur that does not occur now. We
need a harmonization standard that recognizes the digital cultural
divide and that allows enough breathing space for culture industries
in developing countries to grow so that sustainable development is
an achievable goal. "Cash 'n' carry" creativity leaves uninterrogated
the inequalities of access and capacity of the public domain, and
ultimately preserves them to the harm of the Third World.18 1
178

ALIKHAN, supra note 53, at 80-81.

See generally id. at 64-80 (demonstrating how Asian, African, and South American
countries have taken advantage of the internet and intellectual property rights to grow their
economies); IDRIS, supra note 51, at 25 (demonstrating how the sale of traditional music
boosts a country's GDP).
180 Examples of such deculturizing uses include unauthorized pop music borrowings from
indigenous artists, tourist souvenirs, and comic book heroes. See, e.g., BROWN, supra note
135, at 5-7 (concerning publication of native songs online); Kimberly Christen, Gone Digital:
AboriginalRemix and the Cultural Commons, 12 INT'L J. CULTURAL PROP. 315, 324-25, 32829 (2005) (discussing the creation of DVDs about aboriginal culture, which take images and
sounds of traditional cultures-obtained for free because of a lack of ownership concept-and
distribute them for profit); Long, supra note 158, at 622 (stating that most indigenous groups
do not wish to have their folklore and practices commercialized); Riley, supra note 158, at 72
(explaining that cultural music such as the Navajo "Beauty Way" song can be downloaded
illegally for free on the internet).
18, See, e.g., Chander & Sunder, supra note 169, at 1351-54 (discussing four main
inequalities of access and capacity between developed nations and the Third World).
179
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IX. HARMONIZING THE DISSONANCE
In creating a future harmonization standard for copyright, we
must give authors breathing space to create while avoiding the
mistakes of the past in connection with presently excluded voices.
This requires some lessening of past barriers (such as in connection
with traditional knowledge), but does not require a dismantling of
all authorial control. To the contrary, to create a more workable
future standard, we should limit the impetus for "cash 'n' carry"
creativity to assure that aesthetic creativity is encouraged. This
requires the grant of some level of authorial control beyond
compensation for use. At a minimum, based on the personal
relationship between authors and their works, and their desire to
control the creation of their works, authorial control must include
enhanced first publication rights. Such rights, however, would
terminate at the author's death and would not be descendible. The
purpose of the first publication right is to honor the creator's right
to determine when his work is complete, and, therefore, ready for
publication/dissemination.
Such creative decisions necessarily
require a living author. The purpose of this right is not to protect
the image of the author or her privacy, but only the creative
determination of what comprises a "work" and its mode of first
publication (if at all).
Fair use must be balanced against aesthetic creative
incentivization goals.
Since copyright is the only intellectual
property right that actually provides a large free compulsory license
for use of its works, 8 2 this free license should be offered in a
nuanced manner. Fair use is a critical component in a copyright
system, but it is not the supreme component in assuring the future
of a vibrant public domain. Thus, for example, while there may be
instances in which a right of first publication may be trumped by
fair use, those instances should be relatively rare. Fair use should
not become the mechanism through which authorial rights are
transformed into "cash 'n' carry" creativity.
The question of
derivative works must be dealt with in a manner where authorial
control over derivative uses supports the creativity incentivizing
goals of copyright.
Just as compensation alone is an insufficient right, compensation
for all uses of any portion of a copyright protected work is similarly
inappropriate. Too much control over derivatives can be as harmful
182

Otherwise known as "fair use." See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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to the public domain and the encouragement of aesthetic creativity
as too little. These suggested limitations are directed solely to the
narrow issue of the scope of rights which authors and other creators
should receive in an effort to craft a harmonized standard of
protection that more properly serves the goals of encouraging
aesthetic creativity. As copyright is reconfigured to reflect the
needs of the Digital Age, there are other aspects which must be
considered. These include expanded definitions of originality and
authorship to incorporate the many works of collaborative creativity
that are increasingly becoming the creative norm, even when such
collaboration may be cross-generational. As such new definitions
are incorporated into any regime, the needs of all countries and
peoples must be considered or dissonant harmonization will become
the insurmountable obstacle to the desired goal of harmonization.
CONCLUSION

"Cash 'n' carry" creativity as an international standard, without
sufficient calibration for cultural and other dissonances will only
continue to marginalize already-excluded voices, without achieving
the desired goal of enhanced creation of new works. In order to
create a truly effective authorial right-carefully bounded by the
needs of incentivization, public dissemination, and end user
access-more study is required to determine what rights, if any,
encourage aesthetic creativity. More study is also required to
determine the relationship between aesthetic and innovative
creativity, including any differences in what motivates possessors of
such creativity to create works and inventions, respectively.
Insights into differences between the two should help craft
copyright and patent regimes that more appropriately serve their
distinctive goals. While "cash 'n' carry" creativity has the facial ease
of increased end user access with some level of compensation for
authorial rights, it is too broad a brush for today's global digital
media. Science may help us calibrate the differences so that
authors, end users, and developing countries may benefit from a
more rational approach. Hopefully, when aesthetic creativity is
better understood, we will be able to create international standards
that will decrease the dissonance and more adequately serve the
goals copyright was designed to serve. Effective harmonization
requires no less.
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